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ABSTRACT  
  
 
Identifying Structure in Introductory Topology: Diagrams, Examples, and Gestures 
  
Keith Gallagher  
 
 Despite the prevalence of research in calculus, linear algebra, abstract algebra, and 
analysis in undergraduate mathematics, the teaching and learning of general topology is a largely 
unexplored area of research. Although enrollment in courses like linear algebra is often higher 
than that of topology, the study of students’ learning and understanding of topology is of great 
significance to the Research in Undergraduate Mathematics Education (RUME) community. 
Courses in topology present many students with their first experience in axiomatic reasoning and 
explicit interactions with mathematical structure, itself. 
 I present a thorough case study of Stacey, an undergraduate taking a first course in 
undergraduate topology. Through the lenses of mathematical structuralism, constructivism, 
embodied cognition, and commognition, I investigated Stacey’s proving behaviors. Papers 1, 2, 
and 3 present a top-down description of Stacey’s behaviors as she sought to identify the key 
ideas of proofs in general topology. In Paper 1, I described Stacey’s proving behaviors using 
vocabulary borrowed from the literature on problem solving and showed that she used diagrams 
to arrive at the key idea. In Paper 2, I observed that Stacey seldom produced specific examples, 
but she reasoned about her diagrams as examples and manipulation of these examples led her to 
the key ideas of several proofs and to identify appropriate counterexamples when necessary. In 
Paper 3, I used the theories of embodied cognition and commognition to argue that Stacey’s use 
of diagrams to ground abstract structures in the external world gave her the ability to manipulate 
those structures spatially, ultimately leading her to the key idea. These three papers are three 
perspectives on the same theme, each digging more deeply than the one before. 
 Stacey’s behaviors in Papers 1, 2, and 3 describe her search for and investigation of 
abstract mathematical structures. Stacey’s recognition of structure and her ability to work with it 
helped her to succeed in writing proofs. I conclude this dissertation with suggestions for 
teaching, including incorporation of the theories of embodied cognition and commognition, as 
well as directions for future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Topology is the study of properties that remain invariant under twists, stretches, and 
deformations, without tearing or gluing. The field has strong connections to analysis and 
geometry, but it is often taught as a stand-alone course or sequence in which students specifically 
study topological properties like connectedness, compactness, and metrizability as elements of 
mathematical structure devoid of any specific context (e.g., function spaces). Topology is 
generally considered an advanced mathematics course, sharing that distinction with areas like 
abstract algebra and real analysis. 
 However, while abstract algebra and real analysis have become mainstream topics in the 
study of undergraduate mathematics education, students’ understandings of topology remain 
largely unexplored, though there has recently been increased interest in studying this 
phenomenon. Courses like abstract algebra, analysis, linear algebra, and calculus receive 
thorough treatment in the RUME literature because they are taken by a relatively large number 
of students. Calculus, linear algebra, and abstract algebra are common requirements for 
mathematics teacher education programs, and real analysis is commonly required for the 
completion of a degree in mathematics. Courses in topology, however, are often left as electives, 
so fewer students generally take these courses. 
 Despite relatively low enrollment in topology courses, it is vital that we study the 
teaching and learning of topics in these courses. As Cheshire (2017) pointed out, for many 
students, their first course in topology is their entry into axiomatic thinking. Students must learn 
to work directly with mathematical structures, often in the absence of specific examples. This 
kind of thinking is challenging for students (Berger & Stewart, 2018, 2019), but it is the essence 
of advanced mathematical thinking and therefore is worthy of study. 
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 This dissertation contributes to the literature on undergraduate mathematics education by 
providing insight into undergraduates’ development of understanding of abstract structures. In 
the three papers in this dissertation, I present an in-depth case study on the behaviors of Stacey, 
an undergraduate taking a first course in general topology. I examined Stacey’s proof writing 
behaviors from the perspectives of problem solving, examples, and embodied cognition, paying 
special attention to the diagrams and imagery she used to help her reason through her proofs. My 
results showed that Stacey’s success in proof writing hinged on her recognition of key ideas, and 
that her recognition of key ideas was supported by her exploration of abstract mathematical 
structures through grounding them in diagrams and manipulating their resulting spatial 
properties. I conclude by discussing implications for classroom pedagogical practice and 
suggestions of directions for future research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Proof 
 It is well known that students struggle to write and to recognize valid mathematical 
proofs (Alcock & Weber, 2010; Azrou & Khelladi, 2019; Harel & Sowder, 1998; Iannone & 
Inglis, 2010; Komatsu, Jones, Ikeda, & Narazaki, 2017; Leron, 1983, 1985; Moore, 1994; Selden 
& Selden, 2003; Zhen, Weber, & Mejia-Ramos, 2016). Many potential reasons for students’ 
inabilities to write proofs have been identified: inadequate content-area specific knowledge 
(Azrou & Khelladi, 2019; Moore, 1994), difficulty interpreting the logical structure of the 
statement to be proved (Zandieh, Roh, & Knapp, 2011), lack of proof techniques and strategic 
knowledge (Weber, 2001), differences in values and norms between novices and experts 
(Dawkins & Weber, 2016; Harel & Sowder, 1998), and others. With regard to proof validation, 
Komatsu et al. (2017) noted that students at the secondary level benefited from the activity of 
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searching for local counterexamples in the form of diagrams, but that students struggled to 
produce appropriate diagrams for this purpose. Selden and Selden (2003) suggested that direct 
instruction in proof validation can improve students’ abilities to identify valid and invalid proofs. 
 Students reason about proof in different ways. Weber and Alcock differentiated students’ 
reasoning into two main categories: syntactic reasoning and semantic reasoning (Alcock, 2004; 
Alcock & Inglis, 2008; Weber, 2009; Weber & Alcock, 2004; Weber & Alcock, 2009). Syntactic 
reasoners tend to think about proof using formal definitions, symbols, and logic, while semantic 
reasoners prefer to use informal methods like diagrams and examples to help them write proofs. 
Ultimately, while these reasoning methods differ, the proof products resulting from each method 
are the same. Zazkis, Weber, and Mejía-Ramos (2016) identified productive behaviors used by 
students who produced graphical arguments to translate their arguments into valid symbolic 
proofs. 
Examples 
 A learner’s personal example space is “the set of mathematical objects and construction 
techniques that a learner has access to as examples of a concept while working on a given task” 
(Sinclair, Watson, Zazkis, & Mason, 2011, p. 291). Sinclair et al. expanded upon this notion, 
noting that the example space is not merely a collection of examples but rather has a particular 
structure dictated by the ease of accessibility of examples to the learner, the connections the 
learner sees among examples in the space, and the learner’s recognition of generality in a 
particular example. Individual examples have properties known as their dimensions of possible 
variation (Mason & Watson, 2008). These are the properties of a mathematical object that can be 
changed without the object losing its status as an example. Marton and Tsui (2004) argued that 
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students may struggle to generate examples of a concept without explicit practice manipulating 
the dimensions of possible variation of the concept. 
 Examples are known to give insight into learners’ understandings of definitions and 
processes (R. Zazkis & Leikin, 2007, 2008). Studies on example use in proof show a variety of 
different behaviors, including generating examples to clarify a statement or definition, producing 
an intuitive argument to translate into a proof, or to identify counterexamples (Alcock, 2004; 
Alcock & Inglis, 2008; Mason & Pimm, 1984). It seems that students are generally aware of the 
purposes and limitations of appropriate example use in proof, but their implementations of 
examples toward these ends are not always successful (Alcock & Weber, 2010). 
Gesture 
 Many researchers establish a direct link between communication and gesture (Alibali & 
Nathan, 2007; Alibali et al., 2014; Alibali, Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011; Beilock & Goldin-
Meadow, 2010; Bernard, Millman, & Mittal, 2015; Dargue, Sweller, & Jones, 2019; Hostetter & 
Alibali, 2008; Lakoff, 2012; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; McNeill, 1992, 2005; Narayanan, 1997; 
Roth, 2000, 2001; Sfard, 2009; Straube, Green, Bromberger, & Kircher, 2011; Varela, Rosch, & 
Thompson, 1993). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data have shown that regions 
of the brain associated with language use and interpretation overlap with regions associated with 
gesture use and interpretation (Bernard et al., 2015; Straube et al., 2011). Gesture use has been 
shown to influence strategy choices in problem solving (Alibali et al., 2011) and gestures are 
often used to facilitate communication (Alibali & Nathan, 2007; Alibali et al., 2014), though the 
effect on comprehension is significantly larger for individuals producing gesture versus those 
observing them (Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Dargue et al., 2019; Hostetter & Alibali, 
2008). 
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 The connection among thought, communication, and gesture is firmly established in the 
literature (Barsalou, 2008; Dargue et al., 2019; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Kendon, 2004; Lakoff, 
2012; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; McNeill, 1992, 2005; Sfard, 2009). The theory of embodied 
cognition provides an explanation for this connection: namely, that abstract ideas held in the 
mind are the direct result of our experiences and perceptions of the external world, and in turn 
these ideas affect our subsequent experiences and perceptions of the world (Barsalou, 2008; 
Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Varela et al., 1993; Wilson, 2002). Sfard’s (2009) theory of 
commognition suggests that thought, verbal communication, and gesture use are all connected 
and directly influence one another, and it treats thought as a form of intrapersonal 
communication. This theory accounts for the effects of gesture and communication on the 
transformation of conception and understanding (Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010). 
Topology 
 Topology is commonly taught as a proof-based course in the American university system 
(Fukawa-Connelly & Newton, 2014). As such, it requires the ability to work within an axiomatic 
system, but for many students, their experience of mathematics prior to topology has been 
heavily conceptual and computational. Cheshire (2017) studied students’ transitions into 
axiomatic thinking through the lens of continuous functions in topology. He reported that some 
of the participants in his study used the axiomatic structure, itself, to build up their understanding 
of continuous functions, but others used their concept images to give meaning to definitions 
(Pinto & Tall, 2002). Cheshire also reported on obstacles his participants faced in their 
transitions to an axiomatic understanding of continuous functions, including epistemological 
obstacles (that is, cognitive conflicts based on deep-seated conceptual beliefs within the 
individual) and non-epistemological obstacles, such as the use of inappropriate definitions and 
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reliance on paradigmatic examples and visual prototypes instead of on formal definitions. 
Conceptual development in topology is particularly slow; Berger and Stewart (2018) observed 
that the majority of undergraduates in a topology course were still in the early stages of 
development of a schema for a topology generated by a basis at the end of the course. In writing 
topology proofs, recognizing the importance of generality in a schema, connections between 
concepts, and relevance of schema to a given task were shown to be difficult for students in 
introductory topology (Berger & Stewart, 2019). 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Over the course of my data collection and analysis, my research questions evolved 
somewhat. My initial plan was to investigate the following seemingly simple question: 
How do students use examples and visualization when writing proofs in topology? 
Topology, as a branch of mathematics, is not well represented in the research literature in 
undergraduate mathematics education, and I wanted to help remedy this. However, as I analyzed 
my data and examined the existing literature on examples and visualization, I realized that there 
may be many nuanced answers to this question, and I would need to be much more specific. 
 In my mind, the most problematic part of my research question was the presence of the 
word visualization. This word means many different things to many different researchers, but in 
general has a very broad meaning, encompassing not just generic diagrams, but mental images, 
graphs, gestures, and even logical symbols and notation produced by students, in addition to 
students’ reasoning about imagery produced by others. I was mostly curious about the intuitive 
images the students generated and used in their reasoning processes, so I thought to study only 
students’ uses of diagrams and mental images. However, as I dug more deeply into my data, I 
realized that making inferences about student’s mental images, to which I had absolutely no 
7 
 
direct access, would require a much more careful study than the one I had designed. I restricted 
myself to an investigation of students’ diagram use in general topology. 
 Working under the assumption that the process of proof writing is, in many ways, similar 
to the process of problem solving, I developed the following initial research questions, which I 
addressed in Paper 1: 
Research Questions for Paper 1 
1. How do students begin their proving processes? 
2. How do novice mathematicians proceed through the phases of Carlson and Bloom’s 
(2005) Multidimensional Problem-Solving Framework? 
3. When students construct a visual representation (e.g., a diagram), how do they use it? 
I had not yet addressed my interest in students’ example use, and I resolved to do so in Paper 2, 
and so generated the following research questions: 
Research Questions for Paper 2 
4. What kinds of examples do students use to help them write proofs in topology? 
5. How do they use them? 
The results of my analysis for Papers 1 and 2 showed that Stacey used her diagrams as examples, 
and furthermore that her reasoning about these examples led her to recognize the key idea of the 
proof in several cases. It was apparent that Stacey’s diagrams had played an important role in 
this process, but I had yet to identify many of the details of this process. 
 I returned to thinking about what was happening in Stacey’s mind. Although I did not 
have direct access to Stacey’s mental images, I did have an abundance of data from which to 
make inferences about them. Rather than looking simply at Stacey’s diagrams, I chose to 
investigate Stacey’s thinking from three perspectives: (1) her speech, (2) her gestures, and (3) her 
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inscriptions (e.g., diagrams and written language and notation). The combination of results from 
three different sources would allow for triangulation (Yin, 2003b) and provide a stronger 
argument. I arrived at the following research question for Paper 3: 
Research Question for Paper 3 
6. How do students synergize cognition, gestures, diagrams, and communication when 
writing proofs in topology? 
Thus, Paper 1 provides a broad overview of the work in this dissertation, arguing that Stacey 
used her diagrams as an aid to identifying the key ideas in topology proofs. Papers 2 and 3 give 
more fine-grained analyses of this result, showing respectively that Stacey reasoned about her 
diagrams as if they were examples, and that the physical and spatial properties of her diagrams 
provided the insight that led to her recognition of key ideas. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Overview 
 My overarching theoretical perspective for this dissertation incorporates elements of 
structuralism (Shapiro, 1997) and constructivism (Piaget, 1985) and the theories of embodied 
cognition (Lakoff & Núñez, 2000) and commognition (Sfard, 2009). I will present a brief 
overview of these theories here and the ways they relate to Papers 1, 2, and 3 (presented later in 
this dissertation). In the subsections that follow, I discuss each component of my theoretical 
perspective in detail. 
 Mathematical structuralism views mathematics as the study of structures, i.e., 
connections and relationships. Piaget’s theory of constructivism states that learners cannot be 
given understanding but must construct it for themselves. The main theme of Papers 1, 2, and 3, 
is Stacey’s construction of the ideas of structure necessary to complete proofs in topology. In 
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Paper 1, I presented an overview of the process of Stacey’s proof productions, highlighting the 
places where she used diagrams in order to recognize the key ideas of those proofs. In Paper 2, I 
emphasized that Stacey used her diagrams as structural examples, examples that contained only 
the skeleton, or basic structure, of what we traditionally think of as examples. Through Stacey’s 
manipulations of the properties of those examples, she was able to recognize key ideas of proofs. 
In Paper 3, I presented Stacey’s structural examples as embodiments of her mental images, 
allowing her to interact physically with her abstract ideas to make connections between abstract 
structures and physical ones. 
 Embodied cognition proposes that cognitive structures are influenced by physical 
perception, and vice versa. The theory of commognition complements this by recognizing 
communication (i.e., speech, gesture, and inscriptions) and cognition as the same action. Thus, 
interaction with a diagram is not merely an external, physical action, but is really a cognitive 
action. While I utilize these theories most explicitly in Paper 3, I argue that Stacey’s creation of 
diagrams was an act of grounding her mental structures in the physical world. This imbued her 
mental structures with physical and spatial structure. She was then able to manipulate the 
physical structures she had created and use her perceptions of these manipulations, together with 
familiar cognitive schema, to inform her understanding of the abstract structures in question. 
Structuralism and Constructivism 
 Shapiro (1997) claims that “mathematics is the science of structure” (p. 99). This is the 
basis of mathematical structuralism: that underlying every example, there is an essential 
structure, and the purpose of mathematics is to discover that structure. Indeed, mathematics is the 
study of connections and relationships. From a young age, we learn how numbers relate to one 
another, and we are taught that combining numbers makes bigger numbers and taking away 
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numbers makes smaller ones. We are taught cause and effect, that the occurrence of one event 
triggers the occurrence of others: the beginnings of logical implication. In advanced 
mathematics, we write proofs to identify relationships among properties, and we perform 
calculations to determine the connections among numbers. Resnik (1981) claims that numbers 
are insignificant on their own; it is only when considered as points or locations within a structure 
that numbers have meaning. Parsons (1995) supports this claim, further arguing that 
mathematical objects cannot exist independent of a structure: “[R]eference to mathematical 
objects is always in the context of some structure, and… the basic objects involved have no more 
to them than can be expressed in terms of the basic relations of the structure” (p. 74). 
 Mathematical structures can be explicitly described to students, but students cannot be 
forced to learn. That is, understanding cannot be handed to learners; they must build 
understanding for themselves (Piaget, 1985; Wadsworth, 1975). According to the theory of 
constructivism, learning occurs in response to an “intellectual need” (Harel & Soto, 2017, p. 
230), a problematic situation that requires one to learn something new in order to be successful. 
This process is known as adaptation (von Glasersfeld, 2005). Combining the ideas of 
constructivism and structuralism leads to the conclusion that, for learners to recognize 
mathematical structure, they must be placed into a situation in which their success depends upon 
the recognition of mathematical structure, such as writing mathematical proofs. The creation of 
this intellectual need stimulates learners to begin the process of adaptation, for if they are to 
succeed in writing a proof, they must develop an understanding of the underlying mathematical 
structures at play. 
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Embodied Cognition 
 The theory of embodied cognition derives from the idea that our mind develops abstract 
structures in response to external stimuli, and these abstract structures then influence our 
perception of the world (Goldinger, Papesh, Barnhart, Hansen, & Hout, 2016; Hostetter & 
Alibali, 2008; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Radford, 2009; Varela et al., 1993). Cognitive schema are 
one such type of abstract structure used to make sense of the physical world, and they are derived 
from our experiences within it (Lakoff, 2012; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). Schema are mental 
constructs that act like templates for general types of concepts and processes; when certain 
concepts are perceived to be similar, the same schema can be used to reason about them. The 
Container schema, for example, consists of an interior, an exterior, and a well-defined boundary 
separating the two. This schema can be used to reason about many different situations, such as 
being “outside the building,” “in the mathematics department,” or “in the set of real numbers.” 
All of these are not literal containers but can be reasoned about using the same general structure 
represented by the Container schema. 
 Many cognitive schemas exist and are commonly used in mathematics (Lakoff, 2012). 
Indeed, the theory of embodied cognition is highly applicable to the field of mathematics (Lakoff 
& Núñez, 2000). The concept of number originates in counting objects, and even the more 
esoteric branches of advanced mathematics often find some application to the physical world. 
The unbreakable bond between the abstract and the physical often manifests itself in the use of 
gestures during communication. Gesture use can facilitate communication, demonstrate 
understanding, transform knowledge, simulate actions, and even affect decision-making (Alibali 
& Nathan, 2007; Alibali et al., 2014; Alibali et al., 2011; Barsalou, 2008; Beilock & Goldin-
Meadow, 2010; Comi & Eppler, 2011; Dargue et al., 2019; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Kendon, 
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2004; Lakoff, 2012; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; McNeill, 1992, 2005). Thus, gesture use provides a 
rich source of data for the study of students’ understanding and thinking about mathematics. 
Commognition 
 Sfard’s (2001, 2009) theory of commognition states that communication and cognition 
are two parts of a larger whole. Commognition is regarded as the combination of thinking and 
communicating, and argues that it is impossible to do one without doing the other (Sfard, 2009). 
Furthermore, in this context, communication is not limited to speech but encompasses gesture, 
symbol, and diagram use as well. This accounts for the relatively common experience of 
recognizing a previously unnoticed error in reasoning while explaining that reasoning to 
someone else. Given that thinking and communicating are seen as two sides of the same coin, the 
theory of commognition also defines thinking as a special form of communication, that is, 
communication with oneself (Sfard, 2001, 2009). Thus, observing the combination of an 
individual’s speech, gesture use, and inscriptions can provide keen insight into their thought 
processes and understandings of concepts, even in the case where the individual is simply 
communicating with themselves. 
METHODS 
Case Study Methodology 
 I approached my data with a descriptive case study methodology (Cohen, Manion, & 
Morrison, 2013; Hamilton & Corbett-Whittier, 2014; Yin, 2003a, 2003b). There were three 
primary reasons for the selection of this approach. First, topology is an upper-level course whose 
primary enrollment is majors in mathematics, and for them it is only an elective. Thus, I had 
reason to expect that the number of students enrolled in the class would be small, and almost 
certainly some students in the class would decline to participate in my study. Therefore, I 
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anticipated that I would have a very small sample size from which to collect data, so I chose to 
perform a detailed analysis on those students who did participate. Second, “The case study is the 
method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its 
context” (Yin, 2003a, p. 4). The overarching goal of my research was to identify the ways that 
undergraduates utilized visual representations and examples in the context of writing proofs in 
general topology. Clearly, the context in which my research was conducted was essential to my 
ability to address my research questions. Third, “Case studies are the preferred strategy when 
‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed” (Yin, 2003b, p. 1). The nature of my research 
questions was not such that quantitative methods were appropriate, as I was primarily interested 
in describing the nature of phenomena, not how frequently they occurred. 
Protocol 
 My intent was to capture as authentic an image of student behavior as I could. One-on-
one structured or semi-structured interviews can be stressful for students, and I was concerned 
that this type of environment might lead students to behave in ways they normally would not 
have behaved in order to “say what I wanted to hear.” In an attempt to minimize this sort of 
behavior and the anxiety of my study participants, I advertised my data collection as “Group 
Study Sessions.” During each Group Study Session, student participants were presented with 
proof problems related to the content that had been covered in lecture during the preceding week. 
Participants were then encouraged to collaborate to produce the necessary proofs and 
counterexamples. They were also permitted to use their textbooks, their class notes, and any 
other resources they would normally use while studying or working on homework for the class. 
In this way, I hoped to reduce the participants’ anxiety and encourage them to behave in a more 
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natural way. I also hoped that the participants would perceive this structure as beneficial to them 
and therefore be more likely to attend future sessions. 
 One Group Study Session was held per week (with the exception of the first week of the 
study). To work within the participants’ class schedules, Group Study Sessions were held during 
the afternoon and were limited to approximately 1 hour in length. 
 Initially, each Group Study Session was to have a “theme,” or a topic to which all the 
problems in that session related. For example, the theme for Session 1 was “Functions,” and the 
theme for Session 3 was “metrics.” Each Group Study Session was to have the following 
structure: 
 Participants would be asked to generate examples of the theme and describe them 
 Participants would be given three proofs tasks, one at a time: 
o A “Prove” task, which was presented as true and the students would attempt to 
prove 
o A “Disprove” task, which was presented as false and the students would attempt 
to disprove 
o A “Prove or Disprove” task, whose truth value was not specified and the students 
would attempt to prove or disprove 
It quickly became apparent that this was an ambitious structure: during the first two weeks of the 
study, no group of students was able to progress through the entire structure within the allotted 1-
hour timeframe. Thus, the structure was modified: starting in Session 4, participants were no 
longer asked to generate examples at the start of the session. Furthermore, it was no longer 
expected that the participants should finish all three proof tasks in any given session, merely that 
they get as far as they could. 
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 The proof tasks given in each session are listed below, in the order they were presented to 
the participants: 
Session 1 
1. Prove: Let 𝑓: 𝑆 → 𝑇, and let {𝑈௜}௜∈ூ be a family of subsets of 𝑇. Prove that 
𝑓ିଵ(⋂ 𝑈௜௜∈ூ ) =∩௜∈ூ 𝑓ିଵ(𝑈௜). 
2. Disprove: If 𝑓: 𝑆 → 𝑇 and 𝐴 and 𝐵 are subsets of 𝑇, then 𝑓ିଵ(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵) ⊆ 𝑓ିଵ(𝐴). 
3. Prove or Disprove: If 𝑓: 𝑆 → 𝑇 and 𝑔: 𝑇 → 𝑊 are surjective functions, then the 
composition 𝑔 ∘ 𝑓 is surjective. 
Session 2 
1. Disprove: Every relation 𝐶 that is both symmetric and transitive must be reflexive. 
2. Prove: Let 𝑓: 𝐴 → 𝐵 be a function. Define a relation ~ on 𝐴 by setting 𝑎଴~𝑎ଵ if 𝑓(𝑎଴) =
𝑓(𝑎ଵ). Show that ~ is an equivalence relation. 
Session 3 
1. Disprove: Let (𝑥ଵ, 𝑦ଵ), (𝑥ଶ, 𝑦ଶ) ∈ ℝଶ. Then 𝑑൫(𝑥ଵ, 𝑦ଵ), (𝑥ଶ, 𝑦ଶ)൯ = min {|𝑥ଵ − 𝑥ଶ|, |𝑦ଵ −
𝑦ଶ|} is a metric on ℝଶ. 
2. Prove: Let 𝑓: (𝑋, 𝑑) → (𝑌, 𝑑ᇱ) be a function such that there exists a 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 such that for 
all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑦. Prove that 𝑓 is continuous. 
Session 4 
1. Prove: Let (𝑋, 𝒯) be a topological space. Prove that ∅, 𝑋 are closed sets, that a finite 
union of closed sets is a closed set, and an arbitrary intersection of closed sets is a closed 
set. 
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Session 5 
1. Disprove: Let (𝑋, 𝒯) be a topological space, and let 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑋. Define the boundary of 𝐴, 
𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴), by 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) = ?̅? ∩ 𝐶(𝐴)തതതതതതത. Then 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) is both open and closed in 𝑋. 
2. Prove: A subset 𝐴 of a topological space (𝑋, 𝒯) is said to be dense in 𝑋 if ?̅? = 𝑋. Prove 
that if for each open set 𝑂 ∈ 𝒯 we have 𝐴 ∩ 𝑂 ≠ ∅, then 𝐴 is dense in 𝑋. 
Session 6 
1. Disprove: Let (𝑋ଵ, 𝒯ଵ), (𝑋ଶ, 𝒯ଶ), …  , (𝑋௡, 𝒯௡) be topological spaces. Then the set ∏ 𝑋௜௡௜ୀଵ , 
together with the collection 𝒯 of all subsets of ∏ 𝑋௜௡௜ୀଵ  of the form 𝑂ଵ × 𝑂ଶ × … × 𝑂௡, 
where each 𝑂௜ is open in 𝑋௜, is a topological space. 
2. Prove: Let (𝑋, 𝒯), (𝑌, 𝒯′) be topological spaces. If 𝐴 is closed in 𝑋 and 𝐵 is closed in 𝑌, 
then 𝐴 × 𝐵 is closed in 𝑋 × 𝑌. 
Session 7 
1. Disprove: Let (𝑋, 𝒯) be a topological space. Let 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑋. If 𝐷 is a connected subspace of 
𝑋 that intersects both 𝐴 and 𝐶௑(𝐴), then 𝐷 ∩ 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) = ∅. 
2. Prove: Let (𝑋, 𝒯) be a topological space. A separation of 𝑋 is a pair 𝑈, 𝑉 of disjoint open 
subsets of 𝑋 whose union is 𝑋. 𝑋 is connected if no separation of 𝑋 exists. If the sets 𝐶, 𝐷 
form a separation of 𝑋 and if 𝑌 is a connected subspace of 𝑋, then either 𝑌 ⊆ 𝐶 or 𝑌 ⊆
𝐷. 
Session 8 
1. Disprove: ℝ in the cofinite topology is Hausdorff. 
Session 9 
1. Prove: If 𝑌 is a compact subspace of the Hausdorff space 𝑋, and if 𝑥଴ is a point of 𝑋 that 
is not in 𝑌, then there exist disjoint open sets 𝑈 and 𝑉 containing 𝑥଴ and 𝑌, respectively. 
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Participants 
 A total of four student volunteers (3 undergraduates and 1 graduate student) were 
recruited from an introductory undergraduate-level course in general topology. Each student 
volunteer was assigned a pseudonym: Stacey, Tom, and Chris were the undergraduates, and 
Rachael was the graduate student. Each study participant filled out a demographic survey 
indicating their academic major(s), minor(s), and any mathematics courses they had taken 
previously at the university level. Study participants were not required to attend every Group 
Study Session, so the number of students in attendance each week varied. Stacey was the only 
student to attend all Group Study Sessions. Due to the abundance of data I collected from Stacey, 
the results presented in this dissertation focus on her. 
 On Stacey’s demographic survey, she self-reported that she was a Mathematics major 
with minors in Arabic Studies and in English. Stacey indicated that she had completed the 
following mathematics courses prior to enrolling in the current course in general topology: 
 Plane Trigonometry 
 Pre-Calculus with Trigonometry 
 Calculus I (Limits and Differential Calculus) 
 Calculus II (Integral Calculus, Sequences, and Series) 
 Multivariable Calculus 
 Introduction to Proof 
 Introduction to Linear Algebra 
Data Analysis 
 Each Group Study Session was video recorded and transcribed. For each of Papers 1-3 
presented below, I applied deductive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), coding for 
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different themes in each paper. Deductive thematic analysis was the appropriate choice, as I had 
an idea of the basic themes I wanted to explore in each case. 
 For Paper 1, I initially coded for five main themes: orienting, planning, executing, 
checking, and producing or altering a diagram. The first four of these themes derived from the 
Problem-Solving Cycle described in Carlson and Bloom’s (2005) Multidimensional Problem-
Solving Framework, and were operationalized in the same ways. Carlson and Bloom mentioned 
that, in their study, all participants had used a visual representation or a mental image in the 
course of their problem solving. Because I was interested in Stacey’s uses of visual 
representations in proof writing, I began with these five themes in order to identify what kind of 
thinking she was engaged in when she generated visual representations, and to see if I could 
identify what she was using them for. 
 As I applied these initial themes to my data, I took notes indicating anytime I saw 
evidence suggesting what prompted Stacey to produce a visual representation, and anytime I 
could identify a direct outcome of her reasoning about a visual representation. In some sessions, 
like Session 2 (in which the main topic was equivalence relations), Stacey produced very few, if 
any, visual representations. However, in Sessions 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, Stacey produced and 
reasoned about visual representations significantly more often. To focus on similar data, I 
concentrated my attention only on the Prove tasks, and, initially, only on those Prove tasks for 
which Stacey obtained a complete and correct proof. This restricted my data set to the Prove 
tasks from only Sessions 5 and 7. 
 When examining Stacey’s behaviors in Sessions 5 and 7, I noticed that Stacey began each 
Prove task by drawing a diagram to represent the problem, and that after talking about her 
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diagram, Stacey expressed an idea that she then tried to incorporate into a formal proof. This 
prompted me to add one additional theme, recognizing the key idea, and to apply this to my data. 
 For Paper 2, I wanted to take a more in-depth look at Stacey’s example use. I initially 
coded for the themes of specific examples, generic examples, and algorithmically-generated 
examples. Specific examples were those examples which were produced in isolation and for a 
specific purpose, but which gave no impression of generality. Generic examples are specific 
examples but are also seen by the student to be representative of an entire class of examples, as 
one might view a generic parabola as representative of the graph of any quadratic function 
(Mason & Pimm, 1984). Algorithmically-generated examples are specific examples for which 
the student appears to have a rule to generate, as one might generate a list of even numbers by 
starting with 2 and successively adding 2’s (Sinclair et al., 2011). 
 After an initial round of coding with these themes, I noticed that Stacey seemed to reason 
about some of her diagrams as if they were examples, noting their properties, what was and was 
not true about them, and reasoning about what would happen to them if the properties were 
changed. I introduced another theme, structural examples, to represent diagrams such as these 
which Stacey treated like examples, but which lacked the specificity to constitute a traditional 
example. 
 By the time I began to analyze my data for Paper 3, my work on Papers 1 and 2 had 
already made it apparent that Stacey reasoned about some of her diagrams as structural 
examples, and that this treatment was an effort to recognize the key idea of a given proof. For 
Paper 3, I wanted to look more deeply into the mechanism through which Stacey’s structural 
examples led her to recognize key ideas. Appealing to the embodied cognition and 
commognition perspectives, I coded my data again to identify when Stacey used deictic 
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(pointing) gestures, metaphoric (representing abstract ideas) gestures, and iconic (representing 
concrete objects) gestures, and when she reasoned using schemas (see my Theoretical 
Perspective for a more thorough treatment of schemas). I then compared the results of this round 
of coding with the codes I had already assigned for producing or altering a diagram and 
recognizing the key idea to determine connections between Stacey’s speech, gesture use, and 
diagram use and how those connections led Stacey to discover key ideas. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The three papers that follow present a discussion of Stacey’s mental construction of the 
mathematical structures necessary to write proofs in topology (Piaget, 1985; Shapiro, 1997). The 
discussion is presented in a top-down fashion, with the top layer representing a more surface-
level explanation of what Stacey’s behaviors looked like, and the bottom layer providing a more 
in-depth view of how those behaviors led to her success in proving. 
 Paper 1 presents the top layer of the discussion. In this paper, I analyzed Stacey’s proving 
behaviors in terms of problem-solving behaviors described by Carlson and Bloom (2005). I 
chose to analyze Stacey’s behaviors in Group Study Sessions during which she produced a 
diagram, and I described her diagrams and acknowledged that she used those diagrams to help 
her identify the key ideas of the proofs. 
 In Paper 2, I focus more specifically on Stacey’s diagrams, themselves. When Stacey 
produced diagrams, she reasoned about them as if they were examples. These examples, 
however, possessed only the essential properties necessary to meet a particular definition or 
situation, but no others. For this reason, I identified these diagrams as structural examples, and I 
described Stacey’s interactions with her structural examples that led her to recognize key ideas to 
prove true statements and to identify appropriate counterexamples to false claims. 
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 Paper 3 focuses on embodied cognition and commognition. Embodied cognition proposes 
that the formation of abstract ideas in the mind is influenced by perceptions of the external 
world, and subsequently, perceptions of the external world are influenced by the mind. 
Commognition proposes that communication and thinking are two sides of the same coin. Thus, 
speech, gestures, writing, and drawing – all of which are part of the act of communication – 
represent cognitive actions. In this paper, I described how Stacey’s representation of her mental 
constructs in the form of diagrams allowed her to manipulate their physical features, thus directly 
shaping the features of the abstract mathematical objects she held in her mind. Grounding her 
abstract ideas in diagrams allowed Stacey to manipulate them directly, recognize the 
consequences of her actions on embodied objects, and translate those results into consequences 
for the abstract objects in her mind. This manipulation process led Stacey to identify key ideas. 
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PAPER 1: A CASE STUDY OF UNDERGRADUATES’ PROVING 
BEHAVIORS AND USES OF VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS IN 
IDENTIFICATION OF KEY IDEAS IN TOPOLOGY 
Abstract 
Visual representations, such as diagrams, are known to be valuable tools in problem solving and 
proof construction. However, previous studies have shown that simply having access to a 
diagram is not sufficient to improve students’ performance on mathematical tasks. Rather, 
students must actively extract information about the problem scenario from their diagrams for 
them to be useful. Furthermore, several studies have described the behaviors of mathematicians 
and students when solving problems and writing proofs, but few have discussed students’ 
behaviors in the context of proof writing in introductory courses in point-set topology. We 
present a case study of an undergraduate, Stacey, enrolled in a course in general topology. We 
describe Stacey’s proving behaviors through the lens of a problem-solving framework, and we 
present Stacey’s use of diagrams as an aid to discovering the key ideas of proofs in topology. 
Introduction 
 General topology, also called point-set topology, has its roots in geometry and analysis. 
While traditional Euclidean geometry concerns itself with congruences and the preservation of 
distance, topology removes this rigidity and allows for the consideration of more abstract 
properties such as continuity and connectedness (Gemignani, 2015). Topology is the study of 
those geometric properties that may be independent of distance, and as such, it gives us tools to 
identify similarities and differences between objects of different sizes and shapes, such as the 
torus, the sphere, and the plane. Although topology often ignores the notion of distance, it 
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nevertheless describes spatial properties and relationships. It is natural to wonder, therefore, 
about the utility of visual reasoning strategies when considering problems in topology. 
Research into the learning of mathematics has often assumed that students favor one 
method of reasoning, either visual or analytical (Presmeg, 1986). Implicit in such an assumption 
is the notion that visualization and analytical reasoning are disjoint processes, but several 
researchers (Anderson, 1978; Clements, 1982; Presmeg, 1992) argue that this is not the case. 
Coordination of visual and analytical processes in undergraduates’ mathematical thinking led to 
the development of the Visualization/Analysis (VA) Model (R. Zazkis, Dubinsky, & 
Dautermann, 1996), which describes a process by which students might make use of both visual 
and analytical strategies when solving the same problem by alternating between the two 
modalities. Stylianou (2002) expanded this model by describing specific behaviors exhibited by 
mathematicians during visualization steps that informed analytical decisions. Carlson and Bloom 
(2005) developed the Multidimensional Problem-Solving (MPS) Framework based on their 
observations of mathematicians solving problems; they identified patterns that include the use of 
both visual and analytical reasoning strategies. 
Carlson and Bloom’s work showed that mathematicians tended to begin reasoning about 
problems visually, often orienting themselves to the problem scenario by drawing a picture or 
constructing a manipulative. Mathematicians actively used this visual tool, inspecting it for clues 
which led them to design a plan which they then carried out (using more formal methods) in an 
attempt to solve the problem, followed by an evaluation of the work they had done to determine 
the success or failure of their strategy. This framework, however, was built from an analysis of 
experienced mathematicians. This leads naturally to the question: will undergraduates, who are 
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in the beginning stages of learning to prove, display the same pattern of behavior shown by the 
experts? 
 Our aim was to answer the following three research questions in the context of writing 
proofs in a course in introductory topology: (1) how do students begin their proving processes? 
(2) how do novice mathematicians proceed through the phases of Carlson and Bloom’s (2005) 
MPS Framework? and (3) when students construct a visual representation, how do they use it? 
We examined the proving behaviors of four students in an introductory course in point-set 
topology, focusing on the ways these students used visual imagery when reasoning about proof 
tasks. This paper presents a case study of Stacey, who showed a proclivity for producing visual 
representations and using them to help her construct proofs. While Stacey demonstrated many of 
the behaviors described in the MPS Framework, there were key differences in her approach to 
executing and checking her work compared with the approach used by the experts in Carlson and 
Bloom’s study, and the order in which she passed through the phases described in the 
Framework was significantly more variable than those of Carlson and Bloom’s subjects. 
Furthermore, we observed that Stacey’s productions of visual representations frequently took the 
form of a diagram representing a key definition in the problem statement, and that her inspection 
of this diagram led her to identify the key idea (Raman, 2003) of the proof. The results of this 
study suggest that the generation of visual representations by students in introductory topology 
may be an effective, low-cost means of improving students’ performance on proving tasks. We 
hypothesize that this may also improve students’ interest in topology by making advanced 
mathematics more accessible to them. 
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Literature Review 
The act of proving is a composite of external and internal processes, called persuading 
and ascertaining, respectively (Harel & Sowder, 1998). Persuading, the process of convincing 
others of the truth of a statement, relies on the use of definitions, precise mathematical language, 
and notation. Convincing arguments for many basic proofs can be written without deep 
conceptual understanding simply by unpacking definitions. A student who has a general idea of 
how to write a correct proof of a conjecture simply using logic and formalism is said to 
understand the procedural idea of the proof (Raman, 2003). Ascertaining, the process of 
convincing oneself that a statement is true, is a less formal process. A student who has a 
conceptual reason to believe the truth of a conjecture possesses the heuristic idea of the proof 
(Raman, 2003). Ideally, proof exercises in the undergraduate classroom will lead students to 
possess both of these faculties: students should be able to understand and convince others. The 
key idea of the proof is the idea needed to connect a student’s internal understanding to the 
external argument needed to convince others (Raman, 2003). “A key idea is an heuristic idea 
which one can map to a formal proof with appropriate sense of rigor. It links together the public 
and private domains, and in doing so gives a sense of understanding and conviction. Key ideas 
show why a particular claim is true” (Raman, 2003, p. 323). 
 Ascertaining first why a conjecture should be true can help the prover discover the key 
idea of a proof. Empirical data suggest that recognition of the heuristic idea behind a proof 
facilitates understanding of formal algebraic proofs (Raman, 2001); several authors (Gibson, 
1998; Raman, 2003; Weber & Alcock, 2004) recommended that, when asked to prove a 
conjecture, students first construct a graphical argument to determine why the statement is true 
and then base their verbal-symbolic proof on the graphical argument. Zazkis, Weber, and Mejia-
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Ramos (2016) examined how students in a real analysis course translated graphical arguments 
into verbal-symbolic proofs, and they observed that students who produced multiple graphical 
arguments tended to be more successful at constructing proofs than students who produced only 
one graphical argument. This is consistent with results that demonstrate the utility of 
constructing a graphical argument as an aid in writing proofs (e.g., Alcock & Weber, 2010). 
While these studies refer specifically to the use of graphs of functions in proof construction, they 
provide evidence for the effectiveness of the use of visual representations in proof writing. 
 To be successful in problem solving, it is not enough to have a visual representation: one 
must actively seek to extract useful information from it (Booth & Thomas, 2000; Carlson & 
Bloom, 2005; Mason, 1992; Stylianou, 2002; R. Zazkis et al., 1996). For our work, we adapted 
Dimmel and Herbst’s (2015) fairly broad definition of a diagram (originally specified for the 
context of plane geometry) as “the two-dimensional visual representations that accompany 
problems (e.g., proof problems, find problems, determine problems)” (p. 155). The issue of the 
distinction between looking at and using diagrams was raised by Mason (1992), who indicated 
that “students need to be active in processing images; they need to work on the images, not just 
look at them” (p. 5). Booth and Thomas (2000) observed that students with better spatial 
reasoning abilities, including creating, manipulating, and interpreting visual representations, 
were more likely to obtain correct solutions to problems, regardless of whether those problems 
were presented verbally or visually. However, they also reported that spatial ability made no 
difference when students produced their own diagrams, and that all students were more likely to 
produce an incorrect answer in this case. They argued that this was a consequence of these 
students producing but not actually using their diagrams in solving problems. 
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Presmeg (1986) reported that successful students in high school mathematics were 
predominantly nonvisualizers (i.e., students with a preference for nonvisual methods). She 
argued, however, that this may be due to the favor shown to such methods in curriculum design, 
examinations, and teaching emphasis: “Whether this pattern of thinking is adequate at higher 
levels in which creative mathematical thought is required, is an open question, but within the 
constraints of the school system the one-sidedness of nonvisual thinking does not appear to be a 
disadvantage” (p. 301). Though Presmeg’s study seems to show an advantage for students who 
prefer nonvisual methods of solution, she described a few ways in which visual methods proved 
useful. Images provided “mnemonic advantages,” (p. 302) helping students recall facts and 
theorems. It was also observed that “imagery which served an abstract function was found to be 
effective” (p. 302). While Presmeg warned against the “one-case concreteness” (p. 301) of 
images, which can lead students into erroneous reasoning, she observed that when diagrams were 
used not to represent a specific case, but rather to represent an abstract idea held in the mind of 
the student, this could prove beneficial to the student’s reasoning. These findings agree with 
Booth and Thomas’ (2000) claim that “visual stimuli are valuable but an over-reliance on 
imagery in mathematical thinking can limit mathematics performance and difficulties can occur” 
(p. 171). 
 When working through problems, students often rely on their concept image (Tall & 
Vinner, 1981) rather than on the concept definition (Moore, 1994). “The concept image is 
something non-verbal associated in our mind with the concept name. It can be a visual 
representation of the concept in case the concept has visual representations; it also can be a 
collection of impressions or experiences” (Vinner, 2002, p. 68). In everyday life, people do not 
often consult with the definitions of the terms we use; rather, we rely on our concept images of 
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words like table and car to help us understand and reason. Mathematical problem solving, on the 
other hand, is what Vinner referred to as a “technical context” (2002, p. 67). In such contexts, 
consultation with the definition is essential, as the elements of one’s concept image which come 
to mind first – the evoked concept image – may be inappropriate for the given context. “In 
technical contexts, definitions might have extremely important roles. Not only that they help 
forming the concept image but they very often have a crucial role in cognitive tasks. They have 
the potential of saving you from many traps which are set by the concept image” (Vinner, 2002, 
p. 69). Unfortunately, many students attempt to solve problems using only their concept image 
(without consulting the concept definition), which can lead to confusion or invalid reasoning. 
Moore (1994) observed that when students used only their concept images to write proofs, they 
were often unsuccessful; however, when students used imagery to inform their understanding of 
the concept definition, the definition became a more effective tool in students’ proof 
constructions. 
Theoretical Perspective 
 Many studies have investigated factors affecting mathematical problem solving and the 
behaviors of students and experts when solving problems (Carlson & Bloom, 2005; Pólya, 1957; 
Shoenfeld, 1982, 1983; Stylianou, 2002; R. Zazkis et al., 1996). In mathematics and other fields, 
it is common to refer to certain problems, topics, or tasks as “difficult” or “easy.” However, like 
Lester (1994), we are of the opinion that “problem difficulty is not so much a function of various 
task variables as it is the characteristics of the problem solver, such as traits (e.g., spatial 
visualization ability, ability to attend to structural features of problems), dispositions (i.e., beliefs 
and attitudes), and experiential background (e.g., instructional history, familiarity with types of 
problems)” (pp. 664-665). That is to say that the difficulty of a task is not something to be 
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measured objectively and free from any frame of reference, but rather that difficulty is relative to 
the individual performing the task. 
The goal of this study was to describe students’ behaviors during proof construction in 
general topology. For this reason, we approach our data from the perspective of the MPS 
Framework (Carlson & Bloom, 2005). This framework outlines a series of processes, called 
phases, that problem solvers tend to engage in when solving a problem. These phases are 
orienting, planning, executing, and checking. Furthermore, this framework, as well as others in 
the problem-solving literature, recognizes the importance of various attributes of the prover, such 
as their access to resources and heuristics, their affective dimensions, and their tendency and 
ability to self-monitor. In our work, we focus on the behaviors our subject demonstrated as she 
engaged in each of the phases of the MPS Framework. Rather than detail the influence of each of 
her personal attributes as outlined in the MPS Framework, we call attention specifically to the 
prover’s experience with constructing proofs in topology as a critical factor influencing her 
behaviors when reasoning about and constructing proofs. While this framework describes the 
behaviors of expert mathematicians when solving computationally-based problems, we find that 
the behaviors of novice mathematicians when reasoning about proofs can be broadly classified 
into similar categories, with subtle differences. This paper highlights the similarities and 
differences in problem solving behaviors displayed by expert and novice mathematicians, 
respectively. 
We call particular attention to Stacey’s production of visual representations in the form of 
diagrams. Stacey’s diagram construction primarily took place during the orienting phase, 
identified by “the predominant behaviors of sense making, organizing, and constructing” 
(Carlson & Bloom, 2005).  It is known that the construction of visual arguments aids in problem 
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solving and in the generation of proofs (Alcock & Weber, 2010; Booth & Thomas, 2000; 
Gibson, 1998; Raman, 2001, 2003; Weber & Alcock, 2004; R. Zazkis et al., 1996), and it 
appears that students and mathematicians are at least subconsciously aware of this as well: “The 
drawing of a diagram was not a goal in itself but a means to aid [mathematicians] in gaining 
more information for the problem situation. Mathematicians anticipated that a figure would 
provide them with specific information – the drawing of a diagram was not simply a vague step 
forward in the solution of the problem” (Stylianou, 2002, p. 310). We argue in this paper that the 
information Stacey anticipated from her diagrams was the key idea of the proof (Raman, 2003). 
Following the orienting phase, mathematicians transitioned into the planning phase, 
which contained a cycle in which the mathematicians would conjecture a possible solution 
method, imagine applying that method, and then evaluate its effectiveness. This sub-cycle of 
conjecture-imagine-evaluate repeated until the mathematician settled on an approach that 
seemed viable, at which point she transitioned into the executing phase. In the executing phase, 
the mathematician simply carried out the decided-upon plan. This phase was characterized by 
“making constructions and carrying out computations” (p. 63). In the checking phase, behaviors 
focused on spontaneous verification of results obtained in the previous phase. 
As noted in the MPS Framework, the creation of a visual representation of the problem 
(or some part thereof) was a common activity during the orienting phase; this was no different 
for Stacey. As Stylianou (2002) and others argue, such representations are not, on their own, 
useful. Rather, the individual must make an effort to use their representations to gain additional 
insights about the problem. 
Raman (2003) distinguishes between “private” and “public” elements of mathematics: 
“By ‘private argument’ I mean, ‘an argument which engenders understanding’, and by ‘public’ I 
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mean ‘an argument with sufficient rigor for a particular mathematical community’” (p. 321). She 
also highlights a peculiar epistemological difference between expert mathematicians and 
students. Students sometimes see proof production as “creating something out of nowhere” 
(Raman, 2003, p. 322), even if they possess an internal sense that the statement they’re proving 
should be true. For students, connecting a privately held argument (a heuristic idea) with a 
public argument (a procedural idea) may be a laborious task, if they even see that such a 
connection should exist. For mathematicians, however, a primary goal is the determination of 
just such an idea: mathematicians look for a private argument which can be appropriately 
translated into a public argument. Such an argument is based on the key idea of the proof, the 
idea which provides the mathematician both with understanding and with the ability to convince 
others. 
Methods 
 Student volunteers were recruited from an introductory undergraduate course in topology 
at a large research university in the United States for a study on undergraduate students’ uses of 
visual representations when writing proofs in point-set topology. Four students (three 
undergraduate and one graduate) volunteered to participate in the study, and each student 
attended at least one weekly, hour-long “group study session.” Students were not required to 
attend every session, so the number of participants in each session ranged from one to four. No 
group study sessions were held during weeks in which the students had an exam in topology. The 
first author did not teach the topology course but attended each class session (excluding exams) 
to know what content had recently been taught. The first author acted as facilitator for the group 
study sessions. The role of the facilitator was to attend the group study sessions and present 
problems to the students, prompt students for clarification of their thoughts and statements, and 
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move the sessions forward whenever the students seemed to reach an impasse. The role of the 
facilitator was similar to that of a clinical interviewer, though we refrain from referring to the 
facilitator as such in this context due to the informal nature of the sessions. As compensation for 
participating in the study, the facilitator offered extra office hours for participants to receive help 
with topology. 
 The design of the sessions was intended to elicit, to the extent possible, the natural 
behaviors of students when working through a proof task in a homework assignment or on a quiz 
or test. In each session, time permitting, students were asked to prove one true statement and to 
disprove a false one. The order in which the two proof tasks were presented varied from session 
to session. Proof tasks were chosen based on material that had been taught recently in class. 
Students were encouraged to collaborate, and they were permitted to use their textbooks and 
class notes. During their first session, each study participant completed a demographic survey 
indicating their academic major(s), minor(s), and all university-level mathematics courses they 
had taken previously. This was done to give the authors a sense of the students’ prior knowledge 
of mathematics and proving experience. Students were encouraged to speak aloud as they 
worked during the sessions; the facilitator occasionally prompted students to vocalize their 
thinking and asked probing questions. It was also sometimes necessary that the facilitator 
intervened when the students seemed to be making no significant progress on a problem. Due to 
time constraints, the students did not always arrive at complete (or correct) solutions to both the 
“Prove” and “Disprove” problems during the group study sessions. Table 1 below shows which 
types of tasks were completed in each session. 
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Session Prove Disprove 
1 X X 
2 X X 
3 X X 
4 X  
5 X X 
6 X X 
7 X X 
8  X 
9 X  
Table 1: A list of sessions and the types of proof tasks presented in each. 
 Group study sessions were video recorded and transcribed. The data and conclusions 
discussed in this paper focus on the behaviors of one undergraduate student, Stacey, because she 
was the only student present for every session. More specifically, we focus on the results of the 
Prove tasks and exclude the results from the Disprove tasks due to the distinct types of reasoning 
employed by Stacey when proving true statements versus disproving false ones. On occasions 
when Stacey was the only student present, the facilitator’s interactions with her were more 
frequent. There were nine distinct group study sessions and for five of these, Stacey was the only 
student present. 
 Due to our interest in describing how undergraduates interact with visual representations 
(rather than the prevalence or cause of such behaviors), we present our results as a descriptive 
case study of Stacey’s behavior. As Yin (2003b) suggested, we determined that a descriptive 
case study methodology was appropriate due to the necessity to define our research topic 
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broadly. While students’ uses of visual representations have been studied extensively, our study 
is unprecedented due to the specific context of proof-writing in topology. Consequently, there is 
a need to identify the form(s) such behaviors may take in this context. Our goal is to describe, in 
detail, a particular set of behaviors exhibited by Stacey. 
 Initially, extensive notes were taken to identify instances of Stacey producing drawings, 
generating examples, and writing proofs. During this process, it became evident that Stacey 
sometimes used drawings to help her visualize definitions or to represent aspects of the problem 
scenario, and that these drawings seemed to provide her with some insight into the problem or its 
proof. Based on this observation, the session transcripts were coded using deductive thematic 
analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) for instances of Stacey constructing or working on drawings 
related to a definition, instances of Stacey arriving at the key idea of a proof (Raman, 2003), and 
evidence of Stacey’s transitions through the phases of Carlson and Bloom’s MPS Framework 
(2005). 
 The code working on a diagram was applied any time Stacey drew any portion of a 
diagram. This included partial or total diagram construction as well as any time during a session 
that Stacey made a modification or alteration to an existing diagram. Our initial focus was on 
“diagram construction,” but we observed that Stacey sometimes made additions or changes to 
her diagrams as she attempted to make progress on a proof or when explaining her reasoning 
aloud. Excerpts coded as recognizing the key idea occurred, at most, once per problem session. 
This code was used to identify the moment when Stacey vocalized an idea that the authors 
considered to be central to the proof and that Stacey subsequently attempted to apply formally in 
a proof. In order for a piece of transcript to be coded as recognizing the key idea, Stacey must 
have expressed some kind of conceptual understanding of why the proof is true based on this 
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excerpt (e.g., in Session 5, “I get it conceptually I think”). In some cases, Stacey’s nonverbal 
behaviors, such as tone of voice and speaking pace, were taken as evidence of the occurrence of 
a “light bulb moment,” a point during Stacey’s reasoning at which she suddenly gained a new 
understanding of some component of a problem. Excerpts in which the code recognizing the key 
idea was applied can be found in the Results section under the sub-heading Stacey’s Diagrams. 
 We applied a code corresponding to each of the four phases of the Problem-Solving 
Cycle of the MPS Framework (Carlson & Bloom, 2005): orienting, planning, executing, and 
checking. Initial application of each code was in keeping with the descriptions given by Carlson 
and Bloom, as described in the preceding Theoretical Perspective section of this paper. However, 
during initial coding, behaviors were identified which were not documented by Carlson and 
Bloom in their original framework, but which seemed to belong to these categories. These 
behaviors were incorporated into the four codes identifying the phases of the framework, and the 
resulting codes are described below. We present a coded transcript excerpt in Appendix A. 
 Orienting was used to identify any action by means of which Stacey attempted to gain a 
more thorough understanding of a problem. Actions which indicated Stacey’s engagement in the 
orienting phase of the Multidimensional Problem-Solving Framework included deliberate 
reading of the problem (we acknowledge that an initial reading of the problem is necessary; we 
refer here to more thorough scrutiny of the text than a cursory initial reading), extracting notation 
from the text of the problem (i.e., reorganizing notation from paragraph form into a list or 
collection) or converting written language into mathematical notation, drawing diagrams, 
looking up theorems or definitions in the textbook, and asking clarifying questions. It is not 
necessarily the case that actions such as drawing a diagram or asking a question were always 
coded as orienting, as the (perceived) intent of the question must be considered. For example, 
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Stacey sometimes altered a diagram in order to illustrate her thinking or to answer a question 
posed by the facilitator. Such actions were not coded as orienting because the perceived intent of 
the drawing was not to improve Stacey’s understanding but simply to explain it to someone else. 
 Instances in which Stacey expressed consideration of a potential proof strategy or a 
specific step in a proof were coded as planning. Planning activities were those that expressed 
ideas regarding Stacey’s future actions while proving. Such behaviors were nearly always verbal, 
and included such things as the identification of a potential proof strategy (e.g., proof by 
contradiction, proof by contrapositive, etc.), the proposal of a step(s) in a proof, and the 
preemptive recognition of consequences of actions or properties (e.g., if a subspace Y intersects 
nonempty open sets C and D, then Y will not be connected). The last of these behaviors 
resembles the conjecture-imagine-evaluate sub-cycle of the planning phase described by Carlson 
and Bloom. However, Stacey often evaluated the effectiveness of her conjectures by moving into 
the executing phase and simply trying them out rather than through imagination and mental 
evaluation. 
 Any step taken in the production of a written proof was coded as executing. Writing was 
a necessary condition for an action to be coded in this way. Examples of actions that were coded 
as executing include declaring elements and sets (e.g., “Let 𝑂ଵ and 𝑂ଶ be closed sets.”), making 
assumptions and suppositions (“Assume 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 and 𝑥 ∉ ?̅?.”), and drawing logical conclusions 
(“𝐶௑(∅) = 𝑋 and 𝑋 is open, so ∅ is closed.”). 
 Checking occurred anytime Stacey attempted to verify the truth of a claim. Unlike the 
checking documented in Carlson and Bloom (2005), which consisted of a comprehensive 
evaluation of the final answer and solution to a problem, Stacey’s checking took place 
throughout her proving process. Additionally, while Carlson and Bloom identified “internal” 
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checking processes, by means of which their research subjects verified their own work, we 
included “external” checking actions (i.e., asking questions) in this code as well. Stacey 
sometimes appeared to be unsure of the correct implementation of notation and sentence 
structure necessary for the construction of a rigorous proof using topological and set theoretical 
concepts. For example, in the excerpt of coded transcript presented in Appendix A, after 
describing an outline for a proof, Stacey asked “Can you say that points are disjoint, or does it 
have to be sets?” For a question to be coded as checking, it must be a check for language and 
notation usage or a confirmation of logic or content knowledge (e.g., “We want to say that X is 
closed, so that can’t fit the definition, ‘cause we need X to be open for the null set to be closed. 
Or is the null set like a special case with that?”). These types of questions are distinct from those 
asked in the orienting phase, as they are not asked for the sake of understanding the problem but 
rather to ensure the correctness of the solution. 
Results 
 Across group study sessions, we observed several instances of Stacey producing visual 
representations in the form of diagrams that represented a prominent definition in the problem 
statement. Stacey used these diagrams as tools in her search for the key idea of the proof in each 
session. Stacey also spent time in each of the four phases of the Multidimensional Problem-
Solving Framework (orienting, planning, executing, and checking). However, the behaviors in 
which she engaged during her time in each phase differed somewhat from the specific behaviors 
observed in the experts in Carlson and Bloom’s study, and the order in which she passed through 
these phases was inconsistent. 
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Stacey’s Diagrams and Their Role in the Identification of Key Ideas 
 During Sessions 1 and 3, Stacey produced diagrams when prompted by the facilitator, but 
it wasn’t until Session 5 that Stacey spontaneously produced a diagram for the first time. During 
the Prove task, Stacey spontaneously produced diagrams in Sessions 5, 7, and 9. Stacey did not 
produce a diagram during the Prove task in Session 6, and in Session 8, no Prove task was given 
due to time constraints. The diagrams Stacey drew in Sessions 5 and 7 resulted in quick 
recognition of key ideas and subsequently led to formal proof production. While the diagrams 
produced in Session 9 did not result in immediate recognition of key ideas or the ultimate 
production of a proof, Stacey’s focused use of one diagram to investigate the effects of 
individual properties led to significant evolution of her thinking. We argue that this exploration 
of properties was a concerted effort in search of the key idea. 
 In Session 5, Stacey and another student, Tom, were presented with the following 
statement:  
Prove: A subset A of a topological space (𝑋, 𝒯) is said to be dense in X if ?̅? = 𝑋. 
Prove that if for each open set 𝑂 ∈ 𝒯 we have 𝐴 ∩ 𝑂 ≠ ∅, then A is dense in X. 
(Note: the notation Aഥ indicates the topological closure of A in X.) 
 
Figure 1(a-c): Stacey’s diagrams from Session 5. 
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Both students silently read the above prompt to themselves, and Stacey drew the diagram in 
Figure 1a. She explained: 
I can’t really show it with a picture because I can’t draw, like, a dashed line over a 
straight line, or like, a solid line, but we have 𝑋 [2 sec pause] on the outside [2 sec 
pause] and then we have the set 𝐴 [2 sec pause], which is represented by the 
dashed, which I wish I could get closer to this [pointing to the border of 𝑋], but I 
can’t. So if we had the closure of 𝐴, then it would just be the same as that solid [1 
sec pause] line [tracing the border of 𝑋 with her hand]. So then if you take [2 sec 
pause] any open set [drawing circles on her diagram, Figure 1b] [2 sec pause] 
anywhere, there has to be some kind of intersection [2 sec pause] with 𝐴. So if it 
wasn’t, like if you take [2 sec pause], if the intersection could be closed, er, could 
be, not closed, um, the empty set – [draws the diagram in Figure 1c] you’ve got 𝑋 
here, and 𝐴 here, and you could have an open set here, and their intersection 
would be the empty set. [code: recognizes key idea] But then this closure 
wouldn’t be equal to 𝑋. [7 sec pause] I get it conceptually I think, but I’m not sure 
how to prove it. 
Stacey’s inflection changed noticeably when she began, “So if it wasn’t…” as her explanation 
shifted from a simple description of the problem to her consideration of a hypothetical scenario 
in which there exists an open set O whose intersection with A is empty. The pacing of her words 
also changed from a more gradual description with frequent pausing to a more continuous flow 
of ideas as she elaborated on the significance of this hypothetical situation, suggesting a shift in 
her thinking. Stacey’s recognition of the resulting contradiction and concurrent drawing to 
represent it triggered her to consider how to translate this idea into a formal proof. It is not 
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Stacey’s knowledge of how this idea will translate into a proof, but her assessment that it should 
that makes this a key idea for Stacey and for the proof she eventually produced. 
 Stacey was asked to prove the following statement in Session 7: 
Prove: Let (𝑋, 𝒯) be a topological space. A separation of X is a pair U, V of 
disjoint open subsets of X whose union is X. X is connected if no separation of X 
exists. If the sets C, D form a separation of X and if Y is a connected subspace of 
X, then either 𝑌 ⊆ 𝐶 or 𝑌 ⊆ 𝐷. 
 
Figure 2(a-b): Stacey’s diagrams from Session 7. 
When presenting this problem, the facilitator neglected to include in the definition of separation 
that the sets U and V forming the separation must be nonempty. This error did not appear to 
affect Stacey’s reasoning. 
 Stacey drew the diagram in Figure 2a and wrote a few words to begin her proof, but she 
stopped herself to explain: 
If you have X, the ambient space, and then you have the sets C and D, they form a 
separation, so that means that they’re disjoint, so they don’t have any of the same 
elements, and that their union is X, so that is satisfied for this. And then if Y is 
connected, which means it’s not in these sets that are disjoint whose union is Y, 
it’s just one cohesive set, then it has to be either in C [1 sec pause] or [1 sec 
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pause] in D [2 sec pause] It can’t be in both, because if it was like that [draws the 
subset in Figure 2b], it would be disjoint. [code: recognizes key idea] 
Note that while Stacey concluded this excerpt with the word disjoint, we believe she meant to 
say disconnected, as she had just identified the key idea and her proof followed appropriately. As 
with Stacey’s explanation of her diagram in Session 5, her vocal cadence increased when she 
began to describe the hypothetical scenario at the end “Because if it was like that…” Stacey’s 
diagram production and subsequent analysis seemed to lead her to recognize the key idea, which 
in turn led Stacey to begin writing a formal proof right away, and her proof (by way of 
contradiction) focused on this idea of “What if Y was not a subset of C or D?” 
 Stacey produced two distinct diagrams in Session 9. The prompt in Session 9 was the 
following: 
Prove: If 𝑌 is a compact subspace of the Hausdorff space 𝑋, and 𝑥଴ is a point of 
𝑋 that is not in 𝑌, then there exist disjoint open sets 𝑈 and 𝑉 containing 𝑥଴ and 𝑌, 
respectively. 
Referencing her textbook, Stacey drew the first diagram (Figure 3) while the prompt was still 
being written on the board. 
 
Figure 3: Stacey’s diagram representing the Hausdorff condition in Session 9. 
She explained very briefly, “Just reminding myself what Hausdorff is.” In contrast to the 
diagrams produced in Sessions 5 and 7, however, Stacey did not talk much about this one, nor 
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did she interact with it after its initial production. Rather, she translated some of the information 
from the problem into notation (Figure 4) and briefly noted aloud a few facts like “Y is 
Hausdorff” and “Y is closed” before drawing a second diagram (Figure 5): 
 
Figure 4: Stacey’s notation from the Prove task in Session 9. 
 
Figure 5: Stacey’s diagram representing the problem scenario in Session 9. 
Unlike the diagrams Stacey produced in Sessions 5 and 7, the diagram in Figure 5 saw heavy 
use. In Sessions 5 and 7, Stacey was very quick to recognize significant properties of her 
diagram which she began to translate into proofs shortly after drawing the diagram. While Stacey 
completed full proofs (with some assistance) in both of Sessions 5 and 7, she never began the 
process of writing a formal proof in Session 9, instead spending the entire time in exploration 
which included several modifications to the diagram in Figure 5. 
 This is not to say that Stacey made no progress during Session 9. On the contrary, Stacey 
proposed several ideas and expressed astute observations and concerns, which she represented 
using her diagram. Each idea focused on one of the properties given in (or resulting from) the 
conjecture. Stacey first recognized that Y was closed (as a compact subspace of a Hausdorff 
space), then set 𝑈 equal to the complement of 𝑌 and suggested trying to find another open set 𝑉 
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containing 𝑌. Upon recognizing that such sets 𝑈 and 𝑉 may not be disjoint, Stacey abandoned 
this idea. She then focused on the compactness of 𝑌, which she initially said meant that “there is 
a finite number of open sets that can cover 𝑌” (Figure 6, top right). Stacey began to consider 
finding some finite collection of open sets to cover 𝑌 and then taking the union of that collection, 
but she was unsuccessful. She also considered applying the Hausdorff property by taking a point 
𝑦଴ in 𝑌 and choosing disjoint open sets containing 𝑦଴ and 𝑥଴, respectively, but she expressed 
concern that the open set containing 𝑥଴, chosen to be 𝑈, might ultimately intersect the desired 
open set 𝑉 containing all of 𝑌 (Figure 6, bottom right). Though Stacey never began to write a 
formal proof of the statement given in Session 9, her way of thinking about this problem evolved 
considerably during the time she spent working toward one. 
 
Figure 6: The evolution of Stacey’s diagram in Session 9. 
During Session 9, Stacey never identified the key idea of the proof, and she never began to write 
a formal proof. Much of Stacey’s time in Session 9 was spent investigating the roles and 
potential advantages and pitfalls presented by individual properties of the mathematical objects 
involved in this problem. Stacey used her diagram extensively to explore various ideas related to 
her proof, but each idea centered around only one of the properties given in the problem 
statement, e.g., the Hausdorff property or compactness. For the successful completion of this 
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proof, one must coordinate several different properties and see how they work together to imply 
the conclusion of the conjecture. 
 We emphasize here that Stacey never attempted to begin writing a proof in Session 9. On 
the contrary, she spent the entire duration of this session informally trying to determine the 
conceptual underpinnings of the problem and convincing herself why the statement is true. 
Rather than trying to establish the procedural idea of the proof by working formally with 
notation and definitions, Stacey spent her time trying to figure out a heuristic idea that she could 
then translate into a proof – the key idea. We argue that, although Stacey never arrived at the key 
idea of the proof in Session 9 like she did in Sessions 5 and 7, she made a dedicated effort to 
identify the key idea, and that effort was strongly linked to the diagram that Stacey produced at 
the beginning of her work in this session. 
Stacey’s Progress Through the Phases of the Multidimensional Problem-Solving 
Framework 
 In each session, Stacey showed evidence of engaging in each of the four phases of the 
problem-solving cycle described by Carlson and Bloom (2005), provided that she was able to 
obtain a complete proof. During her time in the planning phase, Stacey sometimes engaged in the 
conjecture-imagine-evaluate sub-cycle but did so through interactions with her diagrams. 
Furthermore, during the checking phase, Stacey demonstrated behaviors not described by 
Carlson and Bloom. The order in which she passed through the phases differed from those of the 
experts in Carlson and Bloom’s study as well. 
 A key feature of Stacey’s time in the orienting phase during Sessions 5, 7, and 9 was the 
production of a diagram to represent the problem scenario or a definition relevant to the problem. 
The problems presented in Sessions 5 and 7 introduced terminology that was new for Stacey 
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(dense in Session 5 and separation in Session 7); in each of these sessions, her diagram 
production focused on these definitions. No new definitions were introduced in Session 9; 
nevertheless, Stacey drew a diagram to represent the problem spatially, and throughout her work, 
she used this diagram to explore the various definitions that were involved (Hausdorff, compact, 
closed) in the proof. She also began Session 9 by drawing a diagram to “[remind herself] what 
Hausdorff is,” but she did not work on this diagram during her proving process. 
 Stacey appeared to use her diagrams during her engagement in the conjecture-imagine-
evaluate sub-cycle of the planning phase. For example, in Session 5, Stacey initially represented 
the concept of a dense subset in a diagram, and she convinced herself that the statement of the 
problem made sense by drawing a few open sets and seeing that they intersected with her dense 
subset. She then conjectured about what would happen if the problem statement wasn’t true: If I 
could draw an open set that didn’t intersect with my subset, what would that mean? Rather than 
internally imagining the consequences of this idea, Stacey created a visual representation (Figure 
1c) to investigate her conjecture and appraise its utility. Stacey exhibited similar behavior in 
Session 7 when she considered what would happen if a connected subset Y intersected both parts 
of a separation. This behavior was marked in each case by the use of “What if?” language: “So if 
it wasn’t…” in Session 5, and “Because if it was like that…” in Session 7. Furthermore, this 
language was accompanied in each case by an act of drawing the conjectured situation, from 
which Stacey explained the implications of that scenario. 
 In Session 9, Stacey spent a significant amount of time in the planning phase and never 
moved past it into the executing phase. Stacey’s planning in Session 9 consisted of several 
iterations of conjecture-imagine-evaluate, each of which terminated when Stacey identified a 
conceptual problem with her conjecture. For example, when Stacey recognized that Y was a 
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compact subspace of a Hausdorff space, she correctly identified it as a closed set, and she 
conjectured that the open set she needed containing 𝑥଴ might be 𝑈 = 𝐶௑(𝑌). However, she then 
identified that this would require that 𝑉 = 𝑌 be the other open set named in the problem, causing 
her to reject her hypothesis and identify another conjecture. During each iteration of the sub-
cycle, Stacey’s consultation or modification her diagram led to the rejection of her conjecture. 
In Sessions 5 and 7, Stacey’s time in the planning phase was dominated by her 
conjecture-imagine-evaluate activities. In each case, Stacey quickly recognized that If the 
conclusion of the statement doesn’t hold, then the hypothesis can’t be true, and she decided to 
approach each proof by way of contradiction. This led Stacey to transition into the executing 
phase and begin to construct her proofs. However, in each case, Stacey occasionally returned to 
the planning phase while writing her proof to decide on the best way to accomplish a particular 
step in her proof. For Stacey’s proof in Session 7, she assumed that her connected subspace Y 
intersected both parts C and D of the separation of X, and she began by considering elements 𝑥 
and 𝑦 in 𝐶 and 𝐷, respectively. However, after working for a few minutes, Stacey asked “Should 
I have picked subsets of 𝑌 to start with? That would have made this a lot simpler,” signaling a 
return to the planning phase as she began to assess the effectiveness of a different strategy. 
 In Carlson and Bloom’s study, the experts “spontaneously assessed the correctness of 
their computations and results” (Carlson & Bloom, 2005, p. 63) in the checking phase. While 
Stacey engaged in this behavior, she also conducted extensive external checking, i.e., conferring 
with other students present in a given session or with the facilitator to verify her reasoning. In 
further contrast to the experts in Carlson and Bloom, much of this external checking pertained to 
mathematical language and notation usage. In Session 7, Stacey wrote “Let 𝑌 ⊆ 𝐶 and 𝑌 ⊆ 𝐷,” 
and explained “If we do it by contradiction, and we’d say that there’s intersection with both of 
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them, and then you can show that 𝑌 can’t be connected. Would that be OK?” Stacey’s expression 
of her idea showed that there was a mismatch between her intention and her notation. Recall that 
C and D form a separation of 𝑋 and therefore are disjoint. What Stacey’s notation indicated isn’t 
possible in this context, but her intention to assume that 𝑌 ∩ 𝐶 ≠ ∅ and 𝑌 ∩ 𝐷 ≠ ∅ is 
permissible. Stacey performed a significant amount of checking in this way throughout every 
session, first expressing an idea and then requesting feedback regarding the appropriate way to 
use mathematical language and notation to formalize it. 
 Stacey’s actions during her time in the executing phase of the framework were largely 
unremarkable. What is worth mentioning is the interplay of planning, executing, and checking 
that took place during Stacey’s proof writing process. Once Stacey entered the executing phase 
and began to assemble a formal proof, her transitions among these three phases became 
nonlinear. We present an excerpt from a coded transcript in Appendix A. She returned to the 
planning phase from the executing phase throughout writing a proof when she got stuck on a 
particular step in her proof, for example in Session 7 when Stacey struggled to find the pair of 
disjoint open sets that would produce her desired contradiction as described earlier in this 
section. She sometimes transitioned from planning into (external) checking to determine whether 
her plan was viable prior to implementation. If Stacey returned directly from planning to 
executing, she typically then moved quickly into checking after one or two individual steps in 
her proof, either to confirm logic or to verify language and notation. 
Discussion 
Stacey’s Diagrams as an Aid to Recognizing Key Ideas 
 Stacey’s use of her diagrams in the course of the conjecture-imagine-evaluate sub-cycle 
of the planning phase led her to the recognition of the key idea of each proof, which she then 
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transformed into a formal proof. Of the three sessions presented, Session 9 was the only one in 
which Stacey did not produce a proof, but her repeated reference to her diagram allowed her to 
reject a sequence of unproductive conjectures. In each of Sessions 5 and 7, Stacey’s proofs were 
preceded by the construction of a diagram. Each diagram represented a definition that was 
introduced in the statement Stacey was asked to prove. Avoiding what Presmeg called “one-case 
concreteness,” (1986, p. 301) each diagram merely captured the essence of the definition, 
maintaining abstractness and generality. 
 Mason (1992) and Booth and Thomas (2000) argued that possession of a diagram did not 
guarantee its usefulness, but that students must actively work on their diagrams in order for them 
to be useful. Stacey’s diagrams in Sessions 5, 7, and 9 were used primarily for experimentation 
and exploration. During these sessions, Stacey engaged in conjecturing during the planning 
phase, and she used her diagrams to model the conjectured scenarios and evaluate the usefulness 
of each one. In Sessions 5 and 7, she arrived quickly at a useful piece of information: If there 
exists an open set that does not intersect A, then the closure of A will not be equal to X in Session 
5, and If Y intersects both C and D, then there will exist a separation of Y in Session 7. The 
recognition of these ideas cued Stacey to approach each proof using the method of proof by 
contradiction. Stacey’s success in these sessions hinged not on the fact that she drew a diagram, 
but on the fact that she drew a diagram with the intention of extracting useful information from it 
(Stylianou, 2002). The construction of a formal proof necessitates the use of definitions. 
However, as Moore (1994) suggested, Stacey’s initial reading of the definitions in Sessions 5 and 
7 prompted her to construct an image, informing her understanding of each concept, which then 
allowed her to make more efficient use of the definitions in her subsequent proofs. 
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 This experimentation behavior resembled the conjecture-imagine-evaluate sub-cycle 
described by Carlson and Bloom (2005). Indeed, Stacey’s experimentation included the 
investigation of conjectures and the acknowledgment of the consequences of such conjectures. 
However, while the conjecture-imagine-evaluate sub-cycle occurred internally for the subjects of 
Carlson and Bloom’s study (either through silent consideration or verbal description), Stacey’s 
behavior was manifested externally, with her imagination of the consequences of her conjectures 
being accompanied by modifications to her diagrams. This may result from a difference in 
experience and mathematical maturity between Carlson and Bloom’s subjects and Stacey. The 
conjecture-imagine-evaluate cycle may occur internally for expert mathematicians, but is this 
necessarily so for novices? Furthermore, for the experts, this cycle resulted in a procedural 
approach to solving a problem which could subsequently be executed. For Stacey, this cycle 
yielded conceptual ideas about a proof. While Stacey seemed to acknowledge that there should 
be some sort of bridge between the conceptual idea and the procedural idea, crossing that bridge 
was not automatic. She may have recognized that, if a set Y intersects both parts of a separation, 
then Y must not be connected, but playing out the steps in the proof appeared to only take place 
externally when Stacey moved into the executing phase. 
 Raman’s (2003) definition of key idea as “an heuristic idea which one can map to a 
formal proof with appropriate sense of rigor” (p. 323) describes this behavior perfectly. Stacey’s 
utterance in Session 5 that “I get it conceptually I think” pointed toward a personal 
understanding of the situation; Stacey had ascertained (Harel & Sowder, 1998) why the 
statement is true (the heuristic idea). Though she then claimed to be unsure how to prove the 
statement, Stacey expressed her intention to prove it by way of contradiction soon after as a 
means of translating her heuristic idea into a formal proof. Her behavior in Session 7 followed 
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the same pattern: once Stacey had produced her diagram, she explained what would happen if Y 
intersected both sets C and D and immediately began to write a proof by way of contradiction.  
 In contrast, Stacey never arrived at the key idea of the proof for the statement given in 
Session 9. Rather, she spent the entire session in exploration, investigating the implications of 
the individual properties required by the hypothesis of the statement. Stacey’s explorations, 
however, suggest a concerted effort to discover the key idea of the proof. Recall that, while 
Stacey showed no evidence of having recognized the key idea, she also made no attempt to begin 
writing a proof. Furthermore, Stacey expressed concern over her inability to find open sets U and 
V that would be disjoint. In its own way, this might be interpreted as a “What if?” question, 
similar to those Stacey asked in Sessions 5 and 7. What if the open sets U and V did intersect?
 We make two observations here about the differences between Sessions 5 and 7 and 
Session 9. Perhaps the most apparent of these is Stacey’s chosen proof strategy in Sessions 5 and 
7, namely, proof by contradiction. In the authors’ opinion, proof by contradiction is the simplest 
and perhaps the most obvious way to prove the statements given in Sessions 5 and 7. The 
problem given in Session 9, however, yields most easily to a direct proof. This raises potential 
questions. Is it simply easier, in general, to recognize the key idea of a proof by contradiction? 
Are diagrams more useful for key idea recognition when the method of proof is the derivation of 
a contradiction than they are when the method is direct proof? 
Our second observation regards the level of complexity in the proof tasks. The problems 
in Sessions 5 and 7 both introduced new definitions, but the proof tasks, themselves, were 
relatively uncomplicated. In Session 9, Stacey appeared to have little difficulty identifying the 
implications of individual topological properties, such as the Hausdorff property, compactness, 
or the closedness of sets. Her difficulty, it seems, is in the coordination of two or more properties 
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simultaneously. The proof of this claim relies on the interplay of both compactness and the 
Hausdorff property: the Hausdorff property allows for the identification of pairwise disjoint open 
sets, and the finite collection of open sets containing 𝑥଴ guaranteed by compactness means that 
the intersection of such a collection will also be open. Ignoring either of these properties makes it 
impossible to complete this proof, so the ability to consider the implications of both properties 
simultaneously is essential for success in this problem. It should be noted that, on the basis of our 
evidence, we cannot claim that Stacey would not have reached this conclusion if she were given 
more time. It does seem, however, that while Stacey understood each individual component of 
this problem, she struggled to make connections between them. In Session 5, Stacey remarked, “I 
don’t know why, but I’m having trouble like, reconciling it between having 𝐴 and 𝑋 and open 
sets and closures… being able to put all those in the right order,” pointing to this difficulty in 
coordination that appears to affect Stacey’s success. Stacey was able, with support, to produce a 
proof during Session 5, but the escalation in complexity in Session 9 may have pushed the 
difficulty past a certain threshold for her. Though she may have been able to complete a proof 
with more time, there is a noticeable difference in her ability to cope with such a difference in 
complexity. 
Stacey’s Behavior in the Phases of the Multidimensional Problem-Solving Framework 
 Stacey displayed many of the behaviors that were exhibited by the experts in Carlson and 
Bloom’s (2005) study, but she also displayed several others. Like Carlson and Bloom’s subjects, 
Stacey was adept at producing visual representations to orient herself to problems. Using these 
diagrams to consider the consequences of various properties given in the problems and to ask 
“What if?” questions, Stacey attempted to determine the key idea of the proof, allowing her to 
transition into the planning phase. However, Stacey’s planning seemed to take place more “on-
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the-fly”: she would decide upon a step in her procedure, execute that step, and check it before 
deciding on the next step. As a consequence, Stacey’s time in the executing and checking phases 
occurred in smaller cycles corresponding to individual steps of the resulting proof, rather than 
taking place in one complete proving cycle. 
 Stacey’s checking behaviors differed from those observed by Carlson and Bloom. While 
she did appear to self-monitor to a degree, much of her checking was conducted externally by 
means of conferring with a partner or with the facilitator. Furthermore, her checking was not 
restricted to monitoring of conceptual accuracy, but also linguistic and notational correctness. 
Stacey asked many questions of the facilitator and of her partners throughout each of the sessions 
requesting clarification on concepts. However, she also frequently asked questions to ensure that 
she was using correct mathematical notation and that her word choice and syntax were 
appropriate to express the ideas she wanted to convey in her proofs. 
Such behavior was unlikely to be seen in the subjects of Carlson and Bloom’s study 
because these subjects were experienced mathematicians. Although the problems, themselves, 
were probably unfamiliar to Carlson and Bloom’s subjects, it is likely that they had a significant 
amount of experience working with the concepts and the notation as well as mathematics in 
general. For her part, Stacey lacked all of these advantages. Some of the problems used during 
the course of this study introduced topics that Stacey had not encountered previously. Regarding 
the topics Stacey had already seen, many of them were covered for the first time recently in class 
and had perhaps not had a chance to solidify in her mind. In a more general sense, Stacey was a 
novice mathematician at the time of this study, and her fluency with logic, language, and 
notation was still developing. Stacey’s mathematical inexperience is likely at the heart of the 
difference in planning as well, as Stacey’s ability to think several steps into a problem was 
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probably hindered by the amount of cognitive engagement required for her to complete a single 
step in her head. She had enough experience to recognize the usefulness of broad strategies like 
proof by contradiction, but the more detailed work required to produce the specific proofs 
necessary may have required too much mental processing power to be within Stacey’s abilities at 
this point in her mathematical career. 
Conclusions and Implications for Teaching 
 Our case study of Stacey and her use of visual representations when attempting to write 
proofs in the context of introductory topology revealed a tendency to use diagrams to help 
identify the key idea of a proof. Many authors have suggested that visual representations are of 
little use unless students actively engage with them (Booth & Thomas, 2000; Carlson & Bloom, 
2005; Mason, 1992; Stylianou, 2002; R. Zazkis et al., 1996); this study gives some insight into 
the (possibly implicit) goals some students may seek to accomplish when they inspect their 
diagrams. 
 It is worth recalling that this study investigated a student’s behaviors in the context of 
proving and not problem solving. This focus on generality and logical precision of language and 
notation may elicit from students a different way of thinking than the specificity and 
computations required in solving a specific, more computational problem. Further, this case 
study focused solely on the behaviors of Stacey, as she was the most active of our study’s 
participants. Though we were able to identify this behavior in Stacey, the prevalence of this 
particular behavior among students in general is open for study, as is the exploration of other 
uses of visual representations demonstrated by students writing proofs in introductory topology. 
 With regard to the Multidimensional Problem-Solving Framework (Carlson & Bloom, 
2005), we do not find Stacey’s checking behaviors to be surprising. As a relatively inexperienced 
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mathematician and a newcomer to the field of topology, Stacey’s insecurity regarding her 
language and notation are understandable. Despite the challenges with formality, Stacey’s time 
spent working on her diagrams in the orientating phase often gave her the informal 
underpinnings of what would later become a formal proof, with the appropriate guidance. It is 
also unsurprising to us that Stacey’s plans for a proof often came in a piecemeal fashion rather 
than all at once. Again, due to Stacey’s relative inexperience with proving and with topology, her 
attention and mental processing power may have been divided among those features of 
mathematics that more experienced provers might have relegated to procedural memory, such as 
notation, word choice, and syntax. Even visualization may take place completely internally for 
more experienced mathematicians, as some of these images may have been committed to 
memory through prior use. The amount of Stacey’s focused attention required by each of these 
processes, along with the actual conceptual reasoning involved, likely created a substantial 
barrier to her ability to think several steps into a multi-step proof. 
It has been suggested previously that students do not spontaneously attempt to make 
sense of new or difficult content, but that informal generative learning activities (e.g., drawing a 
picture) can require students to actively make connections and engage with content (Fiorella & 
Mayer, 2016). We found evidence in 6 of the 9 distinct sessions to suggest that the use of 
visualization and visual representations may support students’ sense-making activities when 
writing proofs. Furthermore, the results of this study indicate that the construction of a visual 
representation of a key definition or concept in the statement of a theorem can lead to the 
recognition of the key idea of the proof. Though students are likely to require guidance using 
formal mathematical notation and language, the results of this study support the effectiveness of 
students performing generative learning activities such as drawing a picture or explaining 
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problems or concepts in their own words as aids in proving. These strategies can help students to 
informally “get the idea” and allow them to establish a trajectory that their formal mathematics 
will then follow. Particularly in introductory courses, many mathematical ideas follow from a 
sort of “common sense,” but that common sense is often obscured by highly technical and 
specialized mathematical language and notation. Giving students the tools to see the “common 
sense” reason for the truth of a conjecture may allow students to discuss and reason about 
advanced mathematics in an informal way, making complicated ideas more accessible and 
improving student engagement.  
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PAPER 2: STRUCTURAL EXAMPLES: REPRESENTING 
ABSTRACTNESS IN TOPOLOGY 
Abstract 
Proof writing is considered one of the most important aspects of advanced mathematics. It is 
known that expert mathematicians use examples and visual representations as part of their 
informal mathematics when working toward proof construction. However, the ways 
undergraduates understand and work toward creating proofs is an open area of investigation, 
particularly in advanced mathematics. Furthermore, research on students’ learning and 
understanding in topology is largely unexplored. We present a case study of an undergraduate 
taking a first course in general topology and her informal reasoning which led her to produce 
formal proofs and counterexamples. In particular, we observed that she rarely produced 
“traditional” examples, but in many instances, she reasoned about more abstract “structural” 
examples, which seemed to aid in her proving processes. We argue that these structural examples 
may be useful for students writing proofs in topology, particularly when students may not have 
access to specific examples. 
Introduction 
 Examples are thought to be essential to the development of mathematical understanding 
(Alcock, 2004; Alcock & Inglis, 2008; Alcock & Weber, 2010; Bills & Tall, 1998; Mason & 
Watson, 2008; Tall, 2008; Watson & Mason, 2005; Weber & Alcock, 2009). However, courses 
in advanced mathematics often focus on the presentation of definitions and theorems and the 
construction of proofs rather than on the generation and exploration of examples. In particular, 
topology is one of the most common proof-based courses in the American university system 
(Fukawa-Connelly & Newton, 2014), yet little research on student thinking and learning has 
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been conducted in the context of undergraduate topology, and even less of that research has 
focused on students’ exemplification. 
 Cheshire (2017) studied undergraduates’ development of axiomatic thinking in topology, 
exploring the challenges these students encountered while transitioning into the axiomatic 
system of topology. With regard to instantiation, Cheshire reported on students’ uses of various 
conceptions of the notions of open sets and continuous functions. Berger and Stewart (2018) 
reported on students’ development of schema for a topology generated by a basis, showing that 
even at the end of a semester-long course in general topology, most of their students’ schema for 
this topic were still in the beginning stages of development. Gallagher and Engelke Infante 
(2019) presented a case study analyzing the role visual representations played in the proving 
activities of an undergraduate student in introductory topology and how those representations 
helped her identify the key ideas in her proofs. None of these studies, however, takes the process 
of exemplification as its central focus. 
What constitutes an example? Fukawa-Connelly and Newton (2014) emphasize a 
dichotomy between examples of processes (like the division algorithm) and examples of 
concepts (like groups and fields). Our focus in this paper will be to identify and describe 
examples of concepts in topology and the ways those examples are used in proof construction. 
Watson and Mason (2005) defined an example as “any mathematical object from which it is 
expected to generalize” (p. 3); following this same theme, Alcock and Weber (2010) defined an 
example of a concept as “a mathematical object satisfying the definition of some concept” (p. 2). 
In a study of when and how university faculty teaching proof-based, upper-division 
mathematics courses used examples when presenting proofs, Mills (2014) described an example 
in the following way: 
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[I]t must be specific and concrete as opposed to general and abstract. Specificity 
is a mathematical requirement; the object must represent a particular element of a 
larger class. Concreteness implies that students at this level must be able to either 
compute with it or investigate properties of the mathematical object. Thus, 
concreteness is concerned with the accessibility of the mathematical object to the 
learner. Therefore, I will use the following definition: An example is a specific, 
concrete representative of a class of mathematical objects, where the class is 
defined by a set of criteria. (p.107) 
Along the lines of Watson and Mason’s (2005) definition, however, we propose that specificity 
is not necessarily a required property of an example, only what Mills called concreteness. 
Specificity may be essential for examples of processes, but abstract entities, such as the “blobs” 
Mills described (2014, p. 107), can be used to develop the kind of general understanding that is 
required for a proof, despite their lack of specificity. In our data, we present a case study of a 
student, Stacey, who produced what Mills (2014) called generic diagrams. Mills chose not to 
include diagrams of this kind in her classification of examples, as they lack the necessary 
specificity to represent a particular element of a class. However, we will demonstrate that Stacey 
was able to use such diagrams to investigate the properties of mathematical objects for the 
purposes of proof and counterexample construction. Thus, we define an example to be any 
mathematical object satisfying the definition of some concept, from which it is expected to 
generalize or to investigate the properties of the object. Due to Stacey’s uses of her diagrams to 
build her general understanding of concepts and to investigate their properties, we refer to her 
generic diagrams as structural examples. 
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 Structural examples represent a form of structural reasoning (Dorier & Sierpinska, 2001; 
Harel & Soto, 2017; Leron, 1983, 1985). Harel and Soto (2017) provided the following 
definition of structural reasoning: 
Structural reasoning is a combined ability to: (a) look for structures, (b) recognize 
structures, (c) probe into structures, (d) act upon structures… (e) reason in terms 
of general structures… (f) the ability to see (be aware of) how a piece of 
knowledge acquired resolves a perturbation experienced… (p. 226) 
This definition gave rise to a typology categorizing structural reasoning into five behaviors. Most 
relevant to this discussion will be the behaviors of “recognizing and operating with structure in 
thought… epistemological justification… [and] reasoning in term[s] of general structures” (Harel 
& Soto, 2017, p. 232). The practice of epistemological justification arises out of the 
constructivist notion that 
for any piece of knowledge K possessed by an individual or community, there 
exists a problematic situation S out of which K arose. S, prior to the construction 
of K, is referred to as an individual’s intellectual need: S is the need to reach 
equilibrium by acquiring a new piece of knowledge. (Harel & Soto, 2017, p. 230) 
In other words, an individual’s creation of a new piece of knowledge or mental object must be 
stimulated by a problem to which that knowledge is the answer. In this study, Stacey’s 
intellectual need stems from her need to prove or disprove a mathematical conjecture, which 
requires her to generate a new (for her) mathematical object (a structural example). To resolve 
her intellectual need, Stacey must recognize and reason in terms of general structures as well as 
act upon them in order to see how the structure she has generated resolves the perturbation 
caused by encountering the mathematical conjecture. 
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Generalization Versus Abstraction 
 Generalization and abstraction are both means of reducing complexity in a system by 
identifying components of the system’s structure. These words are often used interchangeably, 
but we believe that there is a subtle yet important difference, particularly within the realm of 
mathematics learning. 
 Generalization is the cognitive process of reducing complexity by recognizing patterns; 
this may be thought of as a “bottom-up” approach to recognizing mathematical structure. To 
generalize is to use specific cases to identify similarities and differences among examples, 
resulting in the recognition of a set of governing rules through a process of comparing and 
contrasting (Harel & Tall, 1991). It is not enough to simply guess at these rules; one must truly 
have a sense of the structure underlying those examples (Mason, Stephens, & Watson, 2009). 
That is, one who is able to successfully generalize a concept has a grasp of the dimensions of 
possible variation, the components of an example that can be changed without removing its 
status as an example (Mason & Watson, 2008). Furthermore, one must acknowledge the full 
extent of the range of permissible change of each such dimension, the set of viable choices for 
those properties that can change (Mason & Watson, 2008). One who has successfully 
generalized a concept has the ability to generate many, or infinitely many, examples of the given 
concept, as they know exactly what can change and how much it can change. By extension, 
however, one must also recognize that which must remain the same; that is, what is “invariant in 
the midst of change” (Mason & Watson, 2008, p. 195). In courses like calculus and geometry, 
this is often where students begin with proof: they search for inductive evidence of truth, that is, 
they convince themselves of the truth of a statement by consideration of several examples, 
examples which sometimes may seem very different but share a common underlying structure. 
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This is useful for developing internal conviction of the truth of a statement; what Harel and 
Sowder (1998) call “ascertaining” and Raman (2003) calls the “heuristic idea” of the proof. 
However, inductive evidence and internal conviction are not enough to guarantee universal 
validity of a claim – infinitely many examples may exist to support a claim, but this does not 
preclude the existence of a counterexample. 
 Abstraction, on the other hand, is a cognitive process of reducing mathematical 
complexity by recognizing underlying structure (Gray & Tall, 2007; Harel & Tall, 1991). In 
contrast to generalization, abstraction may be thought of as a “top-down” approach to thinking 
about mathematical structure. Abstraction need not be the result of considering several examples; 
in fact, one need not ever encounter a single example. One who has successfully abstracted a 
concept need not be aware of the dimensions of possible variation within that concept nor their 
ranges of permissible change but must be acutely aware of what is invariant in the midst of 
change. As such, they can work with the concept itself as representing an entire class of 
examples because they recognize that every such example must share certain common 
properties. This allows them to draw conclusions about every such example without ever 
conjuring a specific example to think about: “Any arguments valid for the abstracted properties 
apply to all other instances where the abstracted properties hold, so (provided that there are other 
instances) the arguments are more general” (Harel & Tall, 1991, p. 40). This is the essence of 
proof: we expect our students to develop the ability to draw conclusions about all mathematical 
objects within a class based on the essential properties of those objects without the need for 
recourse to specific examples. We acknowledge, however, that consultation with specific 
examples is often helpful for developing intuition about a concept, as specific examples allow us 
to work within familiar structures and to recognize the breadth of possibilities and to search for 
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counterexamples. Abstraction allows one to work directly with the underlying mathematical 
structure, itself, without the need for examples. It is what is necessary for successful proof 
writing, as one can work with the structure of all examples simultaneously rather than specific 
cases, guaranteeing the truth of a statement in general. Additionally, abstraction may be useful 
for the construction of counterexamples, as a deep understanding of a concept’s underlying 
structure may help to identify which component of that structure is being neglected or invalidated 
by a false statement, at which point one need only generate one specific example possessing the 
necessary property. Leron (1985) referred to this as using “the given constraints to search for the 
form of the solution-object” (p. 8). 
 Introductory mathematics is often taught with a “bottom-up” approach, in which specific 
examples are shown which possess many unnecessary properties but exhibit the required 
properties and structure that we want our students to abstract. As such, it is no wonder that our 
students should be skilled in example generation and use inductive methods of “proof” while 
struggling with deductive methods. However, at more advanced levels of mathematics, concepts 
are more often taught in a “top-down” structure, in which instruction focuses on theorems and 
proofs – the general structure of a concept – and less attention is given to specific examples, 
except when the need arises to find a counterexample to a false claim. In such “top-down” 
courses, we hypothesize that students will struggle more with the generation of specific examples 
than they might in a “bottom-up” course. Conversely, students in “top-down” courses might be 
more apt to produce (or attempt to produce) deductive arguments than students in “bottom-up” 
courses. 
 Topology is one such course that may be taught in a “top-down” way. Many (though 
certainly not all) courses in general topology begin in relatively familiar metric spaces, which 
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might allow for a comfortable transition into deductive thinking by permitting students the 
ability to work with many familiar examples. However, one of the goals of a course in general 
topology is often to teach students the skill of abstraction, hence these courses are often taught in 
the familiar “definition-theorem-proof” style (Cheshire, 2017), and students may struggle to 
generate specific examples, as they may have little to no experience working in non-metrizable 
spaces and may have never encountered ideas such as separability or compactness, and their 
instructors may place less emphasis on the specific and greater value on the abstract. 
 With this research, we investigated the following research questions: what kinds of 
examples do students use to help them write proofs in topology, and how do they use them? In 
this paper, we describe the proving efforts of Stacey, an undergraduate in a general topology 
course. Throughout the course of our data collection, Stacey continued to provide evidence of 
her desire, and struggle, to produce specific examples of concepts in topology. Yet, despite this 
(or perhaps because of it), Stacey was often successful in constructing proofs and discovering 
counterexamples through her ability to abstract topological ideas. In the course of these 
activities, Stacey generated several objects, which we call structural examples. While she often 
did not generate specific examples, she produced structural examples which she used to reason 
about concepts and proofs. Though her structural examples did not lead her to generate specific 
examples, they did seem to be helpful to her in constructing deductive arguments. The tasks in 
our study were all proof-related. In cases where Stacey was proving a statement true, her 
structural examples seemed to provide a help in determining an appropriate start to the necessary 
argument. In contrast, when she was proving a statement false, it was necessary that she produce 
a counterexample. In those cases, she fell back to familiar examples in ℝ or ℝଶ, but her 
structural examples provided insight into her counterexample choices. We argue that, although 
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Stacey’s structural examples were useful in her quest for successful deductive arguments, they 
did not seem to help her when she needed to produce specific instances of new concepts. 
Nevertheless, they provide evidence that Stacey was able to abstract mathematical concepts 
without necessarily having access to specific examples of those concepts. Moreover, Stacey’s 
structural examples did seem to support her counterexample generation by helping her identify 
which part of a conjecture would be problematic. 
Theoretical Perspective 
 In this paper, we discuss instances of the generation of abstract examples in response to 
proof-related prompts in general topology. The theory of constructivism proposes that 
knowledge and understanding are created in response to an intellectual need; in other words, 
learning is stimulated by the need to solve a problem that cannot be solved with the knowledge 
one currently possesses (Harel & Soto, 2017). According to constructivism, knowledge is 
constructed by the learner. Teachers can expose students to information, but this does not 
guarantee that the student will learn; it is up to the student to internalize and organize the 
information in a way that makes sense to them, and to reorganize their understanding as needed 
to accommodate new information (Piaget, 1985). 
 A commonly held value among mathematicians is that mathematical truths can be 
deduced a priori from certain assumptions and definitions (Dawkins & Weber, 2016). Similarly, 
examples may be constructed based on some kind of prior understanding, either of concepts or of 
example generation techniques. The skill of example generation is invaluable for expert 
mathematicians (Alcock, 2004; Alcock & Inglis, 2008), and there are frequent calls for the 
improvement of methods for teaching students how to generate examples (Mason & Watson, 
2008; Sinclair et al., 2011; R. Zazkis & Leikin, 2008). The ability of proofs and examples to be 
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generated from prior knowledge, rather than simply repeated, is consistent with Piaget’s notion 
of constructivism (1985). The ability of a student to construct knowledge for themselves is 
essential to the learning of mathematics, and is often implicitly assumed by teachers, as many of 
us hope that our students will develop the ability to think through challenging new problems 
rather than simply repeat routine procedures demonstrated in class. The ability to construct 
knowledge and understanding is particularly essential to proof construction, which often requires 
students to not only recognize or develop the steps in a proof, but also to forge the logical 
connections that justify those steps. Furthermore, students and experts alike often find 
themselves generating their own examples to reason through proofs that use unfamiliar concepts. 
 An individual’s personal example space is populated by the examples to which that 
individual has access as well as any methods for example generation the individual possesses 
(Watson & Mason, 2005). Far from being simply a haphazard collection of examples, every 
individual’s personal example space has structure, which can be influenced by the experiences 
and values of the individual (Sinclair et al., 2011; R. Zazkis & Leikin, 2007, 2008). Sinclair et al. 
(2011) described four dimensions along which the personal example space may be structured: 
population, generativity, connectedness, and generality. While population refers to the number of 
examples known by an individual, generativity refers to the possibility of producing more 
examples using known rules for example construction. The ability to generate new examples 
hinges on the individual’s understanding of the dimensions of possible variation within a 
particular class of examples and the corresponding ranges of permissible change (Mason & 
Watson, 2008). These describe the properties of an example which can be changed, and the 
extent to which they can be changed, without robbing the example of its “examplehood.” Even 
after the presentation of several examples, students may still struggle to generate additional 
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examples due to lack of experience in identifying the dimensions of possible variation within a 
class of examples (Marton & Tsui, 2004). Connectedness describes an individual’s awareness, or 
lack thereof, of relationships among particular examples; that is, any similarities or differences 
among examples such as their properties or purposes. The generality of a particular example 
within the space is the extent to which that example is understood to be representative of a larger 
class of examples. This notion correlates directly with Mason and Pimm’s (1984) concept of 
generic examples, those examples which are seen by the individual to be representative of an 
entire class of examples. 
 Examples can give insight into and help structure an individual’s concept image (Bills & 
Tall, 1998). An individual’s example space for a particular topic is a subset of their concept 
image. One’s concept image is “the total cognitive structure associated with the concept, which 
includes all the mental pictures and associated properties and processes” (Tall & Vinner, 1981, p. 
152). As students work with a concept, their concept image is likely to change in accordance 
with their experiences. One’s concept image need not always be coherent, but they need not be 
aware of any inconsistencies. While the individual’s concept image may be complex, the entire 
image need not be evoked at once; it is only when contradictory pieces of the concept image are 
evoked simultaneously that a problem may be detected. The formal concept definition (Tall & 
Vinner, 1981) plays a role in shaping the concept image, though the concept image need not be 
an accurate reflection of the formal definition. In spite of this, students often leverage their 
concept image, rather than the formal concept definition, when working with concepts in new 
contexts such as proof writing (Bills & Tall, 1998; Moore, 1994). 
 The ability to reason structurally (Harel & Soto, 2017) is essential in advanced 
mathematics. Structural reasoning “refers to one’s ability to reason in terms of general 
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structures, not only in terms of their instances” (Harel & Soto, 2017, p. 231). The ability to 
reason in this way absolves the student of the need to consider individual explicit examples when 
solving problems: the ability to reason structurally allows one to think generally about concepts 
like “groups” without needing to reference specific examples like ℤ଻. Necessarily, the student’s 
concept image (Tall & Vinner, 1981) directly influences the student’s representation(s) of the 
structure in question. Harel and Soto (2017) reported on “categories of structural reasoning” (p. 
227) which embody the properties of structural reasoning, and they described instances of each 
category as they observed them in empirical studies. However, the category “reasoning in terms 
of general structures” was not manifested by students in their empirical data. We propose that the 
ability to reason in terms of general structures is at least beneficial, if not necessary, for the 
construction of many proofs in advanced mathematics. In this paper, we describe evidence of a 
student reasoning in terms of general structures by means of structural examples and the ways 
she leverages that reasoning to support her proof construction. 
Methods 
Data Collection 
 Our goal for data collection was to observe the ways undergraduates generate and interact 
with examples and visual representations of concepts when writing proofs in topology. We 
recruited student volunteers from a semester-long undergraduate-level course in point-set 
topology at a large university in the United States. Student volunteers participated in weekly, 
hour-long “group study sessions.” A total of nine sessions were held throughout the semester; 
sessions were not held on weeks during which an exam in the topology class was scheduled. 
Neither of the authors was the instructor of the topology course. The first author acted as 
facilitator during each session, probing students to explain their reasoning or what they found 
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confusing as they worked through proving tasks. The role of the facilitator was similar to that of 
a clinical interviewer, though we refrain from using this descriptor as we did not conduct 
structured clinical interviews. Each group study session was video recorded and transcribed for 
analysis. 
 Each group study session was limited to approximately one hour in length. During each 
group study session, the student volunteers were asked to complete between one and three proof-
related tasks, depending upon the time available and the students’ progress on given tasks. The 
first author attended all class sessions (excluding exams) to determine what content had been 
covered recently, and proof tasks were chosen to align with content covered recently in class. 
Proof tasks consisted of three types of tasks: “prove” tasks, which were presented as true 
statements the students were asked to prove, “disprove” tasks, which were presented as false 
statements the students were asked to disprove, and “prove or disprove” tasks whose truth value 
was not given to the students. The order in which the tasks were presented varied among 
sessions. 
These sessions were intended to mimic an authentic homework and studying environment 
as closely as possible. Furthermore, we hoped that this process would be mutually beneficial for 
the researchers and for the students. Thus, students were encouraged to collaborate to solve 
problems and to reference their notes or textbooks when they felt inclined to do so. Students 
were also permitted and encouraged to discuss their reasoning with the facilitator. The facilitator 
sometimes provided help to the students in the form of demonstrating or modifying the use of 
notation and pointing out errors in logic and reasoning. 
In total, four students (three undergraduates and one graduate student) participated in our 
study. The students’ mathematical backgrounds and experiences with proving varied; during 
69 
 
their first session, each student filled out a demographic survey indicating their academic 
major(s) and minor(s) as well as all mathematics courses they had taken at the college level. In 
order to maximize our data corpus, students were not required to attend every session, but they 
were encouraged to attend as many as they were able. 
Only one student, to whom we assigned the pseudonym Stacey, attended all sessions. The 
data presented in this paper focus on Stacey and should be considered as a case study of Stacey’s 
behaviors in example generation and use when working on proof tasks in general topology. 
Stacey was a second-year undergraduate mathematics major. On her demographic survey, Stacey 
reported having completed courses in differential, integral, and multivariable calculus as well as 
a computationally-based introductory course in linear algebra and an introduction to proof 
course. With this in mind, we assume Stacey’s experience with proof writing in general to be 
limited. However, throughout the course of the study, Stacey mentioned and demonstrated 
knowledge of or experience with basic proving strategies such as direct proof, proof by 
contradiction, and disproving by means of a counterexample. 
Data Analysis 
 Data were initially coded using deductive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Our 
initial coding scheme consisted of three main themes based on types of examples already 
described in the literature: specific examples (isolated examples not intended to represent any 
generality), generic examples (Mason & Pimm, 1984), and algorithmically-generated examples 
(e.g., Sinclair et al., 2011). Those examples coded as specific were produced as isolated 
examples with no evidence to suggest that they were intended to represent any generality. 
Examples coded under this theme were specific in the sense described by Mills (2014): they 
represented a particular member of a larger class, e.g., the interval (0,1) as a specific example of 
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an open set. Examples coded as generic were specific examples Stacey produced along with 
evidence to suggest that she saw them as representative of a larger class of examples. Stacey 
demonstrated an awareness of the arbitrariness of these example choices, as in Session 3 when 
she was asked to produce an example of a constant function, and she shrugged as she said 
“𝑓(𝑥) = 1.” Stacey’s body language and her tone of voice suggested that she thought of constant 
functions as “𝑓(𝑥) = some number” and understood that all functions from this class would 
behave the same way. Algorithmically-generated examples were those that Stacey appeared to 
have a rule for producing. In Session 4, Stacey conjectured that “an open set taking away finite 
sets is still open,” immediately producing the example (0,1)-{2} to demonstrate her reasoning, 
though it was apparent that taking the set difference between any open interval and any singleton 
contained within that interval would have worked equally well. 
 After this initial round of coding, we observed that there were still representations that 
met our definition of example but did not belong to any of the three themes described in the 
preceding paragraph. That is, they were manifestations of mathematical objects which satisfied 
given mathematical definitions, and they appeared to aid Stacey in generalizing or abstracting 
ideas. These examples were akin to Mills’ (2014) generic diagrams, in that they possessed the 
necessary concreteness for Stacey to investigate the properties of the given definition, but they 
lacked specificity in that they did not represent specific members of a given class of 
mathematical objects.  
 The three existing codes (specific, generic, and algorithmically-generated examples) were 
grouped under the heading explicit examples. To categorize the other examples, we defined 
another code called structural examples. A structural example is an example that possesses only 
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the essential properties of a definition but lacks any additional properties that might be present in 
an explicit example. 
Results 
 We present four instances of Stacey’s structural example generation to clarify the nature 
of structural examples: two during the Prove task and two during the Disprove task. When 
Stacey produced a structural example in response to a Prove prompt, she was able to use her 
example to investigate the properties of the object represented in the example. Structural 
examples generated in response to Disprove prompts gave Stacey insight into which portion of 
the prompt was false, guiding Stacey’s search for a counterexample.  
Structural Examples During the Prove Task 
 The structural examples Stacey produced in response to Prove prompts in Sessions 5 and 
7 represented mathematical objects defined in the prompts. Although the structural examples 
were not specific in the sense described by Mills (2014), they possessed the requisite 
concreteness to allow Stacey to explore their properties and how those properties would be 
affected if the conclusion of each prompt were not true. These explorations informed Stacey’s 
decisions in her formal proof writing, in each case leading her to produce an indirect proof. 
 In Session 5, Stacey produced a structural example in response to the prompt to prove the 
following: 
Prove: A subset 𝐴 of a topological space (𝑋, 𝑇) is said to be dense in 𝑋 if ?̅?  =  𝑋. 
Prove that if for each open set 𝑂 ∈ 𝑇 we have 𝐴 ∩ 𝑂 ≠  ∅, then 𝐴 is dense in 𝑋. 
The notation ?̅? denotes the topological closure of 𝐴. We wish to emphasize Stacey’s 
inexperience with the concept of dense subset; as the word dense was written on the chalkboard, 
Stacey vocalized, “Ah, I saw something about this, but I haven’t done anything about it yet. He’s 
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mentioned it I think, but hasn’t said…” Furthermore, in her demographic survey, Stacey 
indicated that she had not taken a course in real analysis; only courses in the introductory 
calculus sequence, an introduction to linear algebra, and an introduction to proof course. Thus, 
we infer that Stacey’s example space for this concept was sparse at best. 
 Upon reading the prompt, Stacey began by constructing a diagram (Figure 7a) which was 
coded as a structural example. 
 
Figure 7(a-c): Stacey's structural examples during the Prove task in Session 5. 
She explained: 
I can’t really show it with a picture because I can’t draw, like, a dashed line over 
a... solid line, but we have X on the outside, and then we have the set A, which is 
represented by the dashed, which I wish I could get closer to this [pointing to the 
border of X], but I can’t. So if we had the closure of A, then it would just be the 
same as that solid line. So then if you take any open set anywhere [drawing circles, 
Figure 7b], there has to be some kind of intersection with A. So if it wasn’t, like if 
you take, if the intersection could be, the empty set [trailing off, drawing Figure 
7c] You’ve got X here, and A here, and you could have an open set here, and their 
intersection would be the empty set. But then this closure wouldn’t be equal to X. 
I get it conceptually I think, but I’m not sure how to prove it. 
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This quote demonstrates Stacey’s view of this diagram as a representation of a mathematical 
object (Alcock & Weber, 2010), namely, a set with a dense subset. Stacey also very clearly used 
her diagram to investigate the properties of such an object (Mills, 2014), as in her construction of 
Figure 7c when she considered the ramifications of the existence of an open set whose 
intersection with 𝐴 was empty. Thus, we identified this diagram as an example. Stacey 
continued, and based on her reasoning using Figure 7c, proved the statement by way of 
contradiction. 
 The most apparent feature of this example is its abstractness; this example possesses all 
the necessary criteria (as Stacey conceptualizes them) to be considered a representation of a set 
with a dense subset, but without any additional properties that might allow us to identify it as a 
specific case. As such, this example may be viewed as a skeleton (Leron, 1985) of a specific 
example, since any specific example must possess the properties represented in this structural 
example. But the example lacks any dimensions of possible variation, such as cardinalities or 
identities of the sets. 
 Stacey exhibited similar behavior in Session 7 when asked to prove the following: 
Prove: Let (𝑋, 𝑇) be a topological space. A separation of 𝑋 is a pair 𝑈, 𝑉 of 
disjoint open subsets of 𝑋 whose union is 𝑋. 𝑋 is connected if no separation of 𝑋 
exists. If the sets 𝐶, 𝐷 form a separation of 𝑋, and if 𝑌 is a connected subspace of 
𝑋, then either 𝑌 ⊆  𝐶 or 𝑌 ⊆  𝐷. 
As in Session 5, Stacey began by drawing a diagram (Figure 8a), which was coded as a structural 
example. 
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Figure 8(a-b): Stacey's structural examples during the Prove task in Session 7. 
After completing the diagram, Stacey began to work on a proof, but she stopped herself to explain: 
If you have 𝑋, which is also the ambient space here, and then you have the sets 𝐶 
and 𝐷, they form a separation. That means that they’re disjoint, so they don’t have 
any of the same elements, and that their union is 𝑋, so that is satisfied for this. And 
then if 𝑌 is connected, which means it’s not in these sets that are disjoint whose 
union is 𝑌, it’s just one cohesive set, then it has to be either in 𝐶 or in 𝐷. It can’t be 
in both [pause] because if it was like that [draws Figure 8b], it would be disjoint 
[misspeaking: disconnected]. 
As in Session 5, Stacey then proved this statement by way of contradiction. While the concept of 
connectedness had been covered recently in Stacey’s topology class, it was introduced there with 
the following definition: “A topological space 𝑋 is connected if the only sets that are both open 
and closed in 𝑋 are the empty set and 𝑋, itself.” Although Session 7 was likely Stacey’s first 
exposure to this particular definition and to the definition of separation, it is less likely that her 
concept image and example space related to connectedness were as much of a blank slate as 
those related to the idea of a dense subset in Session 5. 
 Nevertheless, the structural example Stacey generated was consistent with the definition 
of separation and represented only the essential property that the topological space is composed 
of the union of two disjoint open sets, along with the conclusion of the stated conjecture. Again, 
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Stacey was able to use this example to investigate the properties of such an object and to explore 
the consequences of an open set intersecting both parts of a separation. The example is concrete 
in the sense that it can be used for such experimentation, though it lacks specificity as it does not 
identify a particular separation of a particular set. 
Structural Examples During the Disprove Task 
 Stacey generated structural examples during Sessions 5 and 7 in response to the Disprove 
prompts as well. In each case, Stacey then used her structural example to identify which portion 
of the statement was problematic and would lead to the construction of a counterexample. 
 In Session 5, Stacey was asked to disprove the following statement: 
Disprove: Let (𝑋, 𝒯) be a topological space, and let 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑋. Define the boundary 
of 𝐴, 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴), by 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) = ?̅? ∩ 𝐶(𝐴)തതതതതതത. Then 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) is both open and closed 
in 𝑋. 
Stacey immediately produced the structural example in Figure 9, explaining… 
So we have, 𝐴 is gonna be a subset of the closure. So if we have, this is 𝐴 [drawing 
a circle with a dashed boundary], then if you make the closure, you just close up 
that boundary [drawing a solid boundary over the dashed one, Figure 9a]. But this 
would now be the closure of 𝐴; you take all the arbitrarily close points to 𝐴 and 
include them in 𝐴 [miming scooping points toward the center of 𝐴, Figure 9b]. So 
then, this is 𝐴 again [drawing another circle with a dashed boundary], just the 
complement of 𝐴 would be all the stuff around it [drawing a larger circle with a 
solid border around the dashed circle and shading in between], and then you would 
include that boundary of 𝐴 for the closure of the complement of 𝐴 [drawing a solid 
circle over the dashed one, Figure 9c]. So then the intersection of the closure of the 
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complement and the closure of 𝐴 would just be this line, this… on the outside here 
[shading the border of the first, larger circle, Figure 9c]. I think it would just be 
closed, not open and closed. Not sure how to prove that, but I think it would just be 
closed. 
 
Figure 9(a-c): Stacey's structural examples during the Disprove task in Session 5. 
 Stacey then recognized immediately that the boundary of A must be closed, although she 
appeared to lack confidence in this idea at first. She quickly progressed in reasoning from what 
appeared to be an intuitive snap judgment, through recognition that the intersection of two closed 
sets is closed, and finally to writing a formal proof that the boundary of A must be closed. 
Consequently, it became clear to Stacey that she needed to prove that the boundary of A need not 
be open. 
 Though it became clear later (via direct questioning by the facilitator) that Stacey was 
aware of the utility of a counterexample for disproving false statements, Stacey did not 
immediately attempt to find a counterexample. Rather, the discussion turned toward possible 
methods to prove directly that the boundary of A must not be open. Due to our interest in students’ 
organic behaviors, the facilitator allowed the conversation to continue in this direction for a few 
minutes as Stacey discussed possible routes for writing such a proof, such as showing that the 
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complement of 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) was open (Stacey frequently struggled with the idea that a set might be 
both open and closed) or that 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) satisfied the definition of an open set. 
 After a few minutes, the facilitator posed the question, “How do you prove that 
something is false?” prompting Stacey’s immediate reply of “Counterexample.” Stacey thought 
for a moment, then asked “Could we just do something in ℝ?” She drew a number line and 
labeled the points 0 and 1, then indicated that she wished to consider 𝐴 = (0,1) and explained 
that 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) = {0,1} was not an open set because she could not draw a ball around either point 
that would be contained entirely within 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Stacey's counterexample in Session 5. 
 The diagram Stacey drew in this scenario represented the intersection of a set, 𝐴, and its 
complement, and it seemed to facilitate Stacey’s reasoning about the properties of that 
intersection. Stacey’s structural example did not appear to play a direct role in her eventual 
identification of an appropriate counterexample. However, it does appear that her construction of 
the structural example led her to determine the properties such a counterexample should have, 
namely, that her counterexample should be a set for which the intersection of its closure and the 
closure of its complement should not be an open set. 
 Stacey’s Disprove prompt in Session 7 was the following: 
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Disprove: Let (𝑋, 𝒯) be a topological space. Let 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑋. If 𝐷 is a connected 
subspace of 𝑋 that intersects both 𝐴 and 𝐶௑(𝐴), then 𝐷 ∩ 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) = ∅. 
While reading through the statement, Stacey extracted some of the information into a list of 
notation “so [she] could understand it better,” then she drew the diagram in Figure 11. 
Immediately upon finishing her sketch, she looked at the problem statement, pointed at the text 
“𝐷 ∩ 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) = ∅,” and said “So that has to be the false part” while looking back and forth 
between the text and her diagram. She underlined this portion of the problem statement and 
wrote the word false beneath it. Referencing her diagram, she explained that if 𝐷 must intersect 
both 𝐴 and the complement of 𝐴, then “there’s no way that it also doesn’t intersect with the 
boundary.” 
 
Figure 11: Stacey labeling the false portion of the Disprove prompt in Session 7, beside her structural example. 
 Stacey continued, “So we could give an example in ℝ squared.” She then sketched a pair 
of intersecting circles on a set of coordinate axes and reasoned about the pair of disks 𝑥ଶ + 𝑦ଶ ≤
2 and (𝑥 − 1)ଶ + (𝑦 + 1)ଶ ≤ 2 as specific instances of the sets 𝐴 and 𝐷, respectively (Figure 
12). As she reasoned about this pair of disks, Stacey modified her original diagram to make the 
set 𝐷 more circular, similar to the smaller diagram she drew above it to represent the disks she 
chose for her counterexample. She explained, 
If you have, this is A and A is the disk, this disk with center (0,0) with radius 
square root of 2, and you also take, this is D, and it satisfies D intersect with A 
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isn’t empty, and D intersect with the complement of A isn’t empty, but it does 
intersect the boundary. 
 
Figure 12: The disks with radii √2 centered at (0,0) and (1, −1). 
 As in Session 5, upon completion of her structural example, Stacey immediately 
recognized which portion of the given statement must be false, namely that 𝐷 ∩ 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) must 
not be empty. It is unclear in this case the extent to which her example influenced her choice of a 
specific counterexample. It is worth noting, however, that the sketch of the counterexample 
chosen in this case bears a striking visual similarity to the structural example Stacey produced, 
and Stacey modified her original drawing to look more like the sketch she produced of the disks 
she chose for her counterexample. Much more computationally simple counterexamples to this 
claim exist in ℝ, so it is not unreasonable to suspect that Stacey’s choice of counterexample may 
have been influenced in this case by the salient visual elements of her structural example. What 
seems clear, however, is that Stacey’s construction of a structural example helped her identify 
the property in the prompt that her counterexample must show need not hold. 
Discussion 
 Our definition of example, adapted from Watson and Mason (2005) and Alcock and 
Weber (2010), is “any mathematical object satisfying the definition of some concept, from which 
it is expected to generalize or to investigate the properties of the object” Our data show that 
80 
 
Stacey’s structural examples fit this definition, although they lack the specificity that Mills 
(2014) required of her examples. However, Stacey’s structural examples did demonstrate 
concreteness, which she leveraged in proving true statements to explore the properties of her 
examples. Her structural examples also helped her identify counterexamples by helping her 
determine which property from the conclusion of a false statement must be violated by her 
chosen counterexample. We conclude our discussion with a comparison of explicit examples and 
structural examples in terms of their dimensions of possible variation and ranges of permissible 
change. 
Using Structural Examples to Help Prove True Statements 
 Recall that a structural example is an example that possesses all the essential properties of 
a given concept but no other properties which may be possessed by explicit examples. Structural 
examples are therefore extremely abstract; they act as a sort of template for explicit examples, 
representing every property that must be common to all explicit examples. Stacey produced these 
objects and used them to explore the relevant abstract mathematical structures in Sessions 5 and 
7 (i.e., a set with a dense subset and a connected subspace of a disconnected topological space). 
Stacey was able to convince herself of the truth of each given statement by exploring the 
properties of her example and using her example to investigate what would break down if the 
conclusion failed to hold (Gallagher & Engelke Infante, 2019; Harel & Sowder, 1998; Mills, 
2014; Raman, 2003). Using her structural examples in this way, she quickly determined why the 
given statement was true as well as a starting point for how to prove it. 
 This is exactly the kind of structural thinking required for proof construction; one must be 
able to strip a concept down to its essential components and derive logical conclusions from 
them. Harel and Soto (2017) described several kinds of structural thinking; among them were 
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“recognizing and operating with structure in thought… epistemological justification… [and] 
reasoning in term[s] of general structures” (p. 232). Stacey’s structural examples provide 
evidence of her abilities to recognize structure and reason in terms of general structures. This 
recognition of abstract structure led Stacey to produce proofs in a manner similar to Leron’s 
(1983, 1985) structural method of proof writing. Leron presents the structural method as a 
method of proof delivery, not construction, in which big ideas and overarching themes of the 
proof are presented in the first layer, and subsequent layers of the proof expand upon these ideas, 
filling in details. Stacey’s structural examples helped her develop proofs in a structural style akin 
to Leron’s method, helping her recognize the key ideas of her proofs (Gallagher & Engelke 
Infante, 2019; Raman, 2003) which served as that first layer, which she was then able to expand 
upon in her formal proof writing. The key idea of each proof then serves as Stacey’s 
epistemological justification for the creation of the structural example, as the recognition of the 
key idea justified the creation of the example. 
Using Structural Examples to Identify Counterexamples 
 Though Stacey’s structural examples lacked the specificity to constitute counterexamples, 
they appeared to help her identify which property in a given statement must fail to hold. This is 
often the first step in educated counterexample generation: knowledge of what properties one 
wants and doesn’t want to be present in a counterexample facilitates the selection of one option 
out of many potential options. Thus, Stacey’s structural examples acted as scaffolds to help her 
identify appropriate counterexamples. 
 Throughout the course of this study, Stacey’s concept image (Tall & Vinner, 1981) of an 
open set as a region in which each point can be contained within a ball became apparent. This 
concept image manifested in Session 5, particularly as she discussed the counterexample she 
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chose, 𝐴 = (0,1), and explained that the boundary of this set, 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) = {0,1}, wasn’t open 
because she couldn’t put a ball around either 0 or 1 that would be contained within the boundary 
of 𝐴. Her concept image of closed sets and closure seemed to include drawing solid boundaries 
around closed sets to symbolize including all the points “arbitrarily close,” while open sets 
should be contained within “dashed” curves. In Session 5, It appeared that this imagery, along 
with her structural example, helped Stacey to intuitively identify that the boundary of a set 
should be closed but not necessarily open. Her confidence in this claim grew as she discussed it, 
as she progressed from “I think it would just be closed, not open and closed. Not sure how to 
prove it, but I think it would just be closed,” through “if we’re intersecting two closed sets we’re 
gonna get a closed set,” and finally to a full proof of the fact that 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) is always closed. 
Thus, it became clear to Stacey that the counterexample she needed to find was one whose 
boundary was not an open set. 
 Stacey’s concept image of connected and disconnected sets seemed to include the 
absence or presence of a clear line of separation dividing a set into two sets sharing a boundary. 
When she drew her structural example to represent a set 𝐴 and a connected set 𝐷 intersecting 
both 𝐴 and its complement, it was immediately apparent to Stacey that 𝐷 must intersect the 
boundary of 𝐴. The impact of her structural example on her decision-making was clear, as she 
pointed to “𝐷 ∩ 𝐵𝑑𝑟𝑦(𝐴) = ∅” in the problem statement and announced that it “had to be the 
false part” while looking between her diagram and this part of the claim. Also of note is the 
visual similarity between the geometric features of Stacey’s structural example and the 
counterexample she would later produce, both taking the shape of two intersecting disks. 
 While we do believe that Stacey’s structural examples helped her with counterexample 
identification by clarifying which property in the conclusion of a statement must fail, it is not 
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necessarily the case that they made it clear what specific counterexample would demonstrate this 
failure, nor even that it was always clear that Stacey should look for a counterexample. Note that 
in Session 5, even after Stacey determined that the boundary of 𝐴 need not be open, she initially 
sought a direct proof (which would prove that the boundary of 𝐴 cannot be open) rather than a 
counterexample (to show that it may not be open). It is not clear from our data whether Stacey 
was conscious of the difference in the implications of these two approaches, but it was not until 
the facilitator asked her directly “How do you prove that something is false?” that she began to 
talk about finding a counterexample. 
 We note as well that the textbook used in this course (Mendelson, 2012) did not contain 
images of the type used by Stacey in the instances described above. That is, the textbook did not 
contain images of open sets containing points inside balls, representations of open sets as regions 
with dashed borders, or disconnected spaces as regions with a dividing line. The textbook used in 
Stacey’s calculus courses (Stewart, 2016) also did not use any of these images in its discussion 
of open or connected regions. Though the first author attended lecture sessions for Stacey’s 
topology class, data were not collected with respect to the types of imagery used by the 
instructor, as the main purpose of attendance was to determine appropriate content for the group 
study sessions. Thus, we cannot point to the origins of Stacey’s mental images with any 
certainty. 
Dimensions of Possible Variation and Range of Permissible Change 
 Example generation in mathematics serve two purposes. One of these purposes is 
clarification: mathematical language often differs from everyday speech, and examples can be 
used to decode the meanings embedded in definitions and theorems (Vinner, 2002). The other 
purpose served by example generation is the identification of elements of structure. Examples 
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provide demonstrations of what can change and what can’t – the dimensions of possible variation 
and that which must be invariant in the midst of change (Mason & Watson, 2008). The 
distinctions among the various types of explicit examples (specific, generic, and algorithmically-
generated examples) and structural examples may be elaborated through a careful consideration 
of the attention given to the dimensions of possible variation and their corresponding ranges of 
permissible change during example generation. 
 When asked to provide examples of irrational numbers, many students may simply 
respond with a memorized list of numbers, √2, √3, 𝜋, 𝑒 being common choices. These are 
specific examples, as they aren’t intended to represent any generality, but they do represent 
particular members of the class of irrational numbers. Such a student likely is not keenly aware 
of irrational numbers as those that cannot be represented as a ratio of integers, nor will they be 
able to produce additional examples without great effort. A list like the one above does not give 
any insight into the structure underlying irrational numbers: it shows no true understanding of the 
properties of irrational numbers nor how they might be found or their relationships with rational 
numbers or other irrationals. In providing a list of irrational numbers like the one above, such a 
student does not attend to the dimensions of possible variation among irrational numbers, nor to 
the corresponding ranges of permissible change, likely because the student is not yet aware of 
them. 
 Of course, it is not always necessary to have access to an extensive list of examples in 
order to have some sense of structure. Some students may also produce only a few examples of 
irrational numbers, such as those described in the preceding paragraph. However, they may be 
able to reason about properties of these examples, noting that although they can only produce a 
few examples, they “get the idea.” These students can recognize that any other examples they 
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might find would be similar to these in a few key ways, perhaps in their inability to be expressed 
as ratios of whole numbers or as terminating or repeating decimals. They may even have a sense 
that “taking a square root” is somehow tied to this idea, but that this isn’t all there is to it since 
taking the square root of numbers like 4 and 9 fail to produce irrational numbers. For these 
students, examples like √2 are generic; they can see through the example to understand the 
properties it exemplifies. Such a student is attending to the dimensions of possible variation, but 
not the ranges of permissible change. They have some awareness that changing the number 
under the radical may produce additional examples, but not just any number will do. More 
importantly, they understand that they likely won’t gain much (if any) additional information by 
generating additional examples, as they have achieved some insight into the underlying structure 
of irrational numbers. 
 Still other clever students might notice that taking the square root of a prime number will 
always produce an irrational number. Examples like √2 and √3 become algorithmically-
generated; they are specific, but now can be seen to belong to a larger class of examples, an 
unlimited number of which can be produced as needed. These students are aware of both a 
dimension of permissible change and its range of permissible change, as they recognize not only 
what can change to produce additional examples but also the extent to which it can change. Of 
course, this example generation process cannot generate every irrational number, but a student 
with this knowledge possesses an algorithm for generating as many irrational numbers as 
desired. 
 Because structural examples possess only the essential properties of a concept and 
nothing more, they show a lack of attention to dimensions of possible variation and their ranges 
of permissible change, as changing any property of the example destroys its “examplehood.” 
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What might have prompted Stacey to produce structural examples instead of explicit examples? 
One possibility is that Stacey is unaware of the dimensions of possible variation. In Session 5, 
for example, Stacey encountered the definition of a dense subset for (we believe) the first time. It 
is not unreasonable to think that finding an explicit example might be challenging for her since 
she has never had the intellectual need to explore the dimensions of possible variation (Harel & 
Soto, 2017; Marton & Tsui, 2004). Another possibility is that Stacey realizes that, for the 
purpose of writing a proof, the dimensions of possible variation and their ranges of permissible 
change often don’t matter. With the exception of proof by exhaustion, proof writing typically 
does not require the consideration of a wide variety of cases. Rather, proof writing requires 
attention to the essential structure of a mathematical construct. 
 What distinguishes structural examples from specific examples is the attention to 
structure. Specific examples are often memorized and simply regurgitated without any real 
understanding. Structural examples, on the other hand, are generated, and demonstrate an 
awareness of the underlying structure of the example, as the inessential details of the example 
have been stripped away. The structural example highlights what is invariant in the midst of 
change (Mason & Watson, 2008). It demonstrates understanding of the “big ideas” behind 
concepts even if the details are unclear or unnecessary. 
 Awareness of what is invariant in the midst of change is exactly what is needed for proof 
construction. When writing a proof, these are the only properties that can be used to derive a 
logical conclusion. Knowing what is invariant in the midst of change is essential for 
identification of appropriate counterexamples as well. When one is presented with a conjecture, a 
certain set of properties is specified in the hypothesis and in the conclusion. Being aware that the 
properties given in the hypothesis must not change and what those properties logically imply 
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reduces the list of properties the prover must try to invalidate and highlights those which may be 
problematic. 
Conclusions 
 With this research, we addressed the following research questions: what kinds of 
examples do students use when writing proofs in topology, and how do they use them? We 
described an abstract kind of example that we called structural examples used by one of the 
students in our study. Based on our case study of Stacey, structural examples appear to be a 
productive tool for proof construction and counterexample generation in general topology. They 
can demonstrate a student’s understanding of the underlying structure of abstract mathematical 
objects, and their lack of properties inessential to the given definition prevents the student from 
being distracted by these properties, providing a great benefit in proof writing. Furthermore, 
structural examples appear to help students quickly identify the troublesome properties in false 
statements, helping them determine appropriate counterexamples. 
 Additional studies are needed to determine whether structural examples are widely useful 
for students writing proofs in general topology or if Stacey’s is an isolated case. If structural 
examples do prove to be generally useful, then further studies must determine effective strategies 
for teaching students to generate such examples and to use them to extract useful information for 
their proofs, as simply having a visual representation of a concept does not guarantee its utility in 
problem solving (Booth & Thomas, 2000; Mason, 1992). Another interesting question is whether 
this behavior is common in other areas of mathematics such as abstract algebra, graph theory, 
and calculus, or if there is something unique about topology that encourages this behavior or 
makes it useful. We believe it is not unreasonable to suspect that the geometric nature of this 
field has an influence on students’ approaches to solving problems and is hence worthy of further 
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investigation. Furthermore, Stacey did not always produce structural examples: are certain topics 
within topology more amenable to this strategy than others, and if so, why might that be the 
case? In any case, structural examples provide a powerful tool for informal assessment of 
students’ understandings of the underlying structure of abstract mathematical objects. Structural 
examples serve to expand our understanding of students’ example use in proof writing and may 
have great practical implications for the teaching and learning of topology. 
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PAPER 3: THE COMBINED EFFECT OF GESTURE USE AND DIAGRAM 
CONSTRUCTION ON PROOF WRITING IN TOPOLOGY 
Abstract 
Proof writing is notoriously difficult for students to master. In this paper, we present a case study 
of Stacey, an undergraduate writing proofs in introductory topology. We provide an analysis of 
Stacey’s proof constructions that involved the use of diagrams. We view our data through the 
combined lenses of embodied cognition and commognition, and we show that Stacey’s success 
was largely due to a combination of verbal communication, diagram construction and use, and 
gesture use. We argue that Stacey’s grounding of abstract mathematical ideas in diagrams 
facilitated her applications of cognitive schema for physical relations to the mathematics. 
Furthermore, we propose that Stacey’s communication of her ideas through words and gestures 
transformed her ideas. This combination of communication and application of cognitive schema 
resulted in Stacey’s recognition of the key idea of proof, ultimately leading to successful proof 
construction. 
Introduction 
 Mathematical proving and problem-solving relies heavily on the use of symbols, such as 
mathematical notation, diagrams, and gestures. Symbols can be used as “repositories of 
complexity” (Sfard, 2009, p. 197), storing complicated ideas in a compact form. However, more 
than just storing information, symbols can be used to share and transform information through 
communication and cognition (Comi & Eppler, 2011). In this paper, we present a case study of 
Stacey, an undergraduate in an introductory course in general topology. We observed that, when 
writing topology proofs, Stacey utilized a combination of speech, gestures, and diagrams to 
identify the key idea of the proof (Raman, 2003), at which point she was able to translate that 
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idea into a formal proof. We begin with a discussion of the literature on proofs, diagram use, and 
gesture use in mathematics. 
 Writing mathematical proofs is known to be challenging for students (Alcock & Weber, 
2010; Azrou & Khelladi, 2019; Harel & Sowder, 1998; Iannone & Inglis, 2010; Leron, 1983, 
1985; Moore, 1994). Various potential reasons for students’ difficulties with proof writing have 
been proposed and explored, including a lack of content knowledge (Azrou & Khelladi, 2019; 
Moore, 1994), lack of strategic knowledge and knowledge of proof techniques (Weber, 2001), 
difficulty interpreting the meaning of complex logical statements (Zandieh et al., 2011), and even 
a fundamental difference between the values of mathematicians and students (Dawkins & 
Weber, 2016). 
 Students often spontaneously produce graphical arguments as part of their proving 
processes (Booth & Thomas, 2000; Gallagher & Engelke Infante, 2019; Harel & Sowder, 1998; 
D. Zazkis et al., 2016; Zhen et al., 2016). Zhen et al. (2016) demonstrated that students are often 
aware that graphical arguments, on their own, do not constitute mathematical proof, but they 
believe that such arguments do contain information that can be useful for proof writing. Zazkis et 
al. (2016) examined the work of students who were successful in translating graphical 
information into a formal, deductive argument and identified behaviors that seemed to support 
the success of these students. In our previous work, we determined that Stacey’s visual 
representations played a role in her identification of the key idea of a proof (Gallagher & 
Engelke Infante, 2019). In the current study, we build on this work, showing that it was not just 
Stacey’s diagrams, but rather a complex interplay among her diagrams, gestures, speech, and 
cognition that led her to recognize the key ideas of several proofs. 
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 Gesture use and perception are known to have direct connections to language and 
cognition (Alibali et al., 2014; Bernard et al., 2015; Goldinger et al., 2016; Hostetter & Alibali, 
2008; Lakoff, 2012; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; McNeill, 1992, 2005; Straube et al., 2011; Varela et 
al., 1993; Wilson, 2002). Studies using fMRI have demonstrated that there is a direct connection 
between the interpretation of language and spatial information and the production and perception 
of gesture in the brain (Bernard et al., 2015; Straube et al., 2011). The embodied cognition 
perspective argues that cognition, physical perception, and action are all intimately connected, as 
knowledge is built from perception of external stimuli, and gesture and communication exist for 
the purpose of giving embodiment to mental images and ideas (Goldinger et al., 2016; Lakoff, 
2012; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Varela et al., 1993; Wilson, 2002). Sfard’s (2001, 2009) theory of 
commognition proposes that, rather than being separate processes, thought, gesture, verbal 
communication, and symbol use are really parts of a larger whole. In this paper, we will answer 
the following research question: “How do students synergize cognition, gestures, diagrams, and 
communication when writing proofs in topology?” 
Theoretical Perspective 
 To discuss the role that gestures and diagrams played in Stacey’s construction of 
topology proofs, we approach our data from a hybrid of the embodied cognition perspective 
(Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; McNeill, 1992, 2005; Varela et al., 1993) and the theory of 
commognition (Sfard, 2001, 2009). 
 According to the theory of embodied cognition, the mind does not work on purely 
abstract entities with no counterpart in reality; rather, mental actions are inextricably linked to 
physical actions and perceptions (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Goldinger 
et al., 2016; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Varela et al., 1993; Wilson, 2002). Therefore, mathematical 
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ideas are not purely abstract, but they derive from physically substantiated ideas, and in turn 
must be able to be expressed physically. “To understand a mathematical symbol is to associate it 
with a concept – something meaningful in human cognition that is ultimately grounded in 
experience and created via neural mechanisms” (Lakoff & Núñez, 2000, p. 49). 
 In the embodied perspective, mathematical ideas are often conceptualized via schemas, 
such as the Container schema and the Source-Path-Goal schema. Schemas are cognitive 
structures with a particular set of properties (Lakoff, 2012; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). The 
Container schema, for example, has a structure consisting of an interior, a boundary, and an 
exterior, with the understanding that an object is “in” the container if the object is located in the 
interior. We can apply the Container schema when we recognize that an object or situation we 
have encountered has a similar structure, and we can apply the same logic and language to that 
situation. Schemas give us mental shortcuts to processing complicated information by fitting that 
information into a pattern we already understand. A common example of the application of the 
Container schema to mathematics is the idea of sets. A set acts as a container with a defined 
interior and exterior, the boundary between which being defined by the defining property of the 
set. Thus, we apply the same kind of language as we might with a container, talking about 
“elements inside the set” and “subsets contained within larger sets.” 
 The acknowledgement of cognitive schemas makes it much easier to see the influence of 
embodied cognition in mathematical thought: the schemas representing Containment, Near-Far, 
Contact-Noncontact, Toward, and many others are used frequently in mathematics, and have 
obvious connections to the physical world. With the prevalence of these grounded schemas in 
mathematical reasoning, it should come as no surprise that we should unconsciously assign 
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physical properties to the abstract when reasoning about limits, sets, functions, and numerous 
other concepts and processes in mathematics. 
 It should also be unsurprising that we should gesture when reasoning about mathematics. 
The regions of the brain responsible for language processing and gesture processing overlap, 
already suggesting that gesture should occur spontaneously alongside speech (Alibali et al., 
2014; Bernard et al., 2015; Hostetter & Alibali, 2008; Lakoff, 2012; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; 
Straube et al., 2011). Add to this the fact that mathematical reasoning is inherently based on and 
schematized in terms of the physical world, and you obtain a complex semiotic system in which 
physical gestures derive meaning from and provide meaning to abstract mathematical entities. 
 Due to the complex interrelationship between gestures and verbal communication and the 
fact that one seldom occurs in the absence of the other, we wish to consider gestures and verbal 
communication as part of a larger whole. Sfard (2009) refers to this gestalt as commognition. 
Commognition is a neologism derived from the words communication and cognition. The 
combination of these two words owes to Sfard’s perspective that thinking and communicating 
are two sides of the same coin: what is generally referred to as communication is thought of in 
this perspective as interpersonal communication, while thinking is conceived of as intrapersonal 
communication, or communication with oneself (Sfard, 2001, 2009). Furthermore, in this view, 
gesture and speech are also seen as two parts of a larger whole, as they both serve the purpose of 
enhancing communication. Hence, in adopting this view, we presume that speech and gesture are 
not only tools for interpersonal communication, but they are inherently part of the process of 
cognition as well. 
 Because of our interest in Stacey’s use of diagrams, inscriptions, spoken words, and 
gestures to reason about mathematics, we view her mathematics as a semiotic bundle. A semiotic 
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bundle is made of signs, such as words (oral and written), gestures, drawings, graphs, and 
technological devices, that are produced by people engaged in a discourse. Arzarello, Paola, 
Robutti, and Sabena (2009) noted, 
The novelty of the semiotic bundle…is that it allows us to describe the 
multimodal semiotic activity of subjects in a holistic way as a dynamic production 
and transformation of various signs and of their relationships. In particular, it 
properly frames the role of gestures in mathematical activities. (p. 100) 
This perspective allows us to consider Stacey’s words, gestures, and diagrams as part of a larger 
whole and to consider their combined impact on her reasoning. 
Methods 
Data Collection 
 For this study, we recruited a total of four student volunteers from an introductory 
undergraduate course in general topology at a large university in the United States. These 
students participated in weekly, one-hour group study sessions during which they were asked to 
complete proving tasks related to topology. All group study sessions were video recorded and 
transcribed. The first author acted as facilitator for all group study sessions, presenting problems 
and occasionally prompting students to explain their reasoning. The first author attended all class 
sessions (excluding exams) to determine timely and appropriate topics for the proof tasks in each 
session; proof tasks were contemporaneous with classroom content. Classroom data were not 
collected with regard to the instructor’s delivery of content or proving behaviors. 
 Proof tasks in each group study session consisted of 1-3 problems, depending upon how 
quickly the students progressed through each task. Three types of problem were discussed in 
each session: “Prove” problems, which were given as true, and the students were asked to prove, 
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“Disprove” problems, given as false, and the students were asked to disprove, and “Prove or 
Disprove” problems, whose truth value was not specified. The order in which the problems were 
presented to the students varied between sessions. 
Data Analysis 
 Student volunteers were encouraged, but not required, to attend all sessions. Thus, each 
session was attended by 1-4 students, but the number of students varied. Only one student, 
Stacey, was present for all sessions. Due to the relatively large amount of data we obtained from 
Stacey, the results presented in this paper focus specifically on her behaviors. A qualitative case 
study methodology (Cohen et al., 2013; Yin, 2003b) was applied to determine how Stacey used 
gestures and diagrams in her attempts to write proofs. 
 Because of our interest in the interplay between diagrams and gestures, we first identified 
sessions in which Stacey produced diagrams. For the purposes of this report, we chose to focus 
our analysis only on cases in which Stacey produced a diagram during her work on the Prove 
task. Within these instances, we coded our transcripts to identify when Stacey produced gestures 
while working on a proof. For the discussion of our data, we define a gesture as “movement 
made by the hand with a specific form: the hand(s) begin at rest, moves away from the position 
to create a movement, and then return to rest” (Rasmussen, Stephan, & Allen, 2004, p. 303), a 
definition adapted from (Roth, 2001). We further classified Stacey’s gestures according to 
McNeill’s dimensions of iconicity, metaphoricity, and deixis (Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 1992, 
2005). Deictic gestures are pointing gestures. We identified both static points, in which Stacey 
pointed to something and held her hand or finger in place, and tracing points, in which Stacey 
pointed to something and then moved her hand along it, as in tracing the border of a set in a 
diagram. Iconic gestures are those which represent real-world objects and actions, while 
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metaphoric gestures represent abstract ideas. For consistency, all representational gestures (i.e., 
iconic and metaphoric gestures) that referred to abstract mathematical objects such as sets, 
points, or functions, were coded as metaphoric gestures, since the referents were abstract and not 
concrete. As in McNeill (2005), we believe these dimensions are not disjoint; thus, a single 
gesture was sometimes coded with multiple dimensions. 
 Our previous work showed that Stacey’s diagram use was linked with her recognition of 
the key idea of the proof (Gallagher & Engelke Infante, 2019; Raman, 2003). Hence, we also 
identified the moment in each session when Stacey appeared to recognize the key idea of the 
proof. The key idea is “an heuristic idea which one can map to a formal proof with appropriate 
sense of rigor” (Raman, 2003, p. 323). We operationalized this definition by identifying the 
moment when Stacey first verbally expressed an idea that she would later translate into a formal 
proof. 
Results 
 We describe three instances in which Stacey produced diagrams as part of her proving 
process in the Prove task. In two of these sessions, Stacey demonstrated evidence of having a 
heuristic idea from which to start reasoning about the problem. During these sessions, Stacey 
expressed her idea verbally, and these verbal descriptions were accompanied by alternation 
between diagram construction and modification and gesture production. In these two sessions, 
the combination of communicating verbally, through gesture, and through diagram construction 
led Stacey to identify the key idea of the proof and subsequently to generate a correct proof. In 
the third session, Stacey did not recognize the key idea. However, the combination of Stacey’s 
verbal communication and her inscriptions helped her to refine her reasoning in the pursuit of the 
key idea. 
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 In Session 5, the Prove task was to show the following: 
Prove: A subset 𝐴 of a topological space (𝑋, 𝑇) is said to be dense in 𝑋 if ?̅?  =  𝑋. 
Prove that if for each open set 𝑂 ∈ 𝑇 we have 𝐴 ∩ 𝑂 ≠  ∅, then 𝐴 is dense in 𝑋. 
 The notation ?̅? was used to indicate the topological closure of the set 𝐴. After reading the 
prompt, Stacey immediately drew the diagram in Figure 13 (left). 
 
Figure 13: Stacey’s diagrams in Session 5. 
After she finished drawing her diagram, Stacey reasoned while looking between the written 
problem statement and her diagram, 
I can’t really show it with a picture because I can’t draw a dashed line over a … 
solid line, but we have 𝑋 [static point to the label 𝑋 (left)] on the outside [tracing 
point along the boundary of 𝑋 (left)] and then we have the set 𝐴 [static point to 
the label 𝐴 (left)] which is represented by the dashed [tracing point along the 
boundary of 𝐴 (left)], which I wish I could get closer to this [static point to the 
border of 𝑋 (left)], but I can’t. So, if we had the closure of 𝐴 [tracing a short line 
over the label A with her hand, indicating the notation ?̅? (left)], then it would just 
be the same as that solid line [tracing point along the border of 𝑋 (left)]. So then if 
you take any open set [drawing circles on her diagram (center)] anywhere, there 
has to be some kind of intersection with 𝐴 [static point to one of her open sets 
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(center)]. So if it wasn’t, like if you take, if the intersection could be … the empty 
set [static point to ∅ in the problem statement] – [drawing the diagram in Figure 
13 (right)] You’ve got 𝑋 here, and 𝐴 here, and you could have an open set here, 
and their intersection would be the empty set [recognizes key idea]. But then this 
closure [static point to the boundary of 𝐴 (right)] wouldn’t be equal to 𝑋 [static 
point to the boundary of 𝑋 (right)]. I get it conceptually I think, but I’m not sure 
how to prove it. 
 In this excerpt, Stacey began her reasoning process by drawing a diagram. During her 
explanation, Stacey did not look at the facilitator nor at Tom, the other student present for this 
session. Rather, it seemed as though she was talking to herself, thinking aloud rather than trying 
to communicate anything to the others in the room. As she explained the components of her 
drawing, she interacted with the diagram, using deictic gestures to refer to specific portions of 
the diagram during her explanation. Stacey also altered the diagram, adding new features as she 
began to consider them, then continued to reason while referencing the additions to her diagram. 
After a few repetitions of this behavior, Stacey drew an entirely new diagram (Figure 13, right), 
explaining the key idea that she would later use to construct her proof. Just before Stacey drew 
this second diagram, as she vocalized, “So if it wasn’t…” she began speaking faster and with 
fewer pauses, seeming to suggest that she “got it.” Stacey constructed a proof by contradiction, 
assuming that 𝐴 was not dense in 𝑋 and using this to confirm the existence of an open set 
disjoint from 𝐴. 
 Note the difference in the physical properties of the two diagrams (Figure 13, left and 
Figure 13, right) Stacey produced in this session. In particular, we emphasize the distance placed 
between the border of 𝐴 and the border of 𝑋, as the relative proximity of these two borders 
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seemed to be a significant component of Stacey’s understanding of what it means for a subset to 
be “dense.” Furthermore, it was this change in distance between the borders of A and X that 
allowed Stacey to draw an open set that did not intersect 𝐴. 
 Stacey’s task in Session 7 was to prove the following: 
Prove: Let (𝑋, 𝒯) be a topological space. A separation of X is a pair U, V of 
disjoint open subsets of X whose union is X. X is connected if no separation of X 
exists. If the sets C, D form a separation of X and if Y is a connected subspace of 
X, then either 𝑌 ⊆ 𝐶 or 𝑌 ⊆ 𝐷. 
When presenting this task, the facilitator accidentally excluded from the definition of separation 
the requirement that the sets U and V forming the separation must be nonempty. This did not 
seem to affect Stacey’s proving process. 
 Once again, she began by drawing a diagram (Figure 14, left). 
 
Figure 14: Stacey’s diagram in Session 7. 
 Upon completing her diagram, Stacey explained, 
I can tell you what I’m doing. If you have 𝑋, the ambient space [static point to the 
boundary of 𝑋 (Figure 14, left)], and then you have the sets 𝐶 and 𝐷 [alternating 
static points to the left and right rectangles (left)], they form a separation, so that 
means that they’re disjoint [static points to the left rectangle, then the right (left)], 
so they don’t have any of the same elements, and that their union is 𝑋 [static point 
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to the boundary of 𝑋 (left)], so that is satisfied for this [alternating static points to 
left and right rectangles (left)]. And then if 𝑌 is connected, which means it’s not 
in these sets [iconic gesture using thumb and index finger of each hand in adjacent 
U-shapes, indicating two disjoint subsets of 𝑌 (Figure 15, left)] that are disjoint 
whose union is 𝑌, it’s just one cohesive set [iconic gesture cupping both hands 
into a C-shape and putting them together to form a ball, indicating 𝑌 as a 
connected set (Figure 15, right)], then it has to be either in 𝐶 or in 𝐷. It can’t be in 
both, because if it was like that [draws the subset in Figure 14 (right)], it would be 
disjoint. [recognizes key idea] 
Based on her reasoning, we believe that Stacey misspoke at the end of this quote, meaning to 
suggest that 𝑌 would be disconnected, rather than disjoint. 
 
Figure 15: Stacey’s metaphoric gestures representing a separation (left) and a connected space (right). 
 Stacey’s initial diagram seemed to be a visual representation of her concept image (Tall 
& Vinner, 1981) for this problem, constructed from her initial reading. Her explanation appeared 
to be for the benefit of the facilitator, rather than “thinking out loud” as it seemed to be in 
Session 5. Stacey’s explanations were once again accompanied by gestures indicating 
components of the diagram, such as the disjoint open sets that together made up the separation. 
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She also produced metaphorical gestures representing abstract properties of the mathematical 
objects in the conjecture, like the connectedness of the subspace 𝑌. After Stacey produced 
metaphorical gestures referring to a separation of 𝑌 and the connectedness of 𝑌, she made one 
final addition to her diagram, leading to her expression of the key idea of the proof. She then 
wrote a correct proof of the statement by way of contradiction, using the key idea she identified 
from her diagram: she supposed that 𝑌 intersected both 𝐶 and 𝐷, and derived a contradiction by 
finding a separation of 𝑌. 
 Observe the physical aspects of Stacey’s diagram: a connected space is one that can be 
drawn without a dividing line splitting it into two regions, and the existence of a separation 
corresponds to the existence of such a splitting line. With this imagery, a connected set that sits 
atop the dividing line of a separation immediately becomes disconnected, as it is physically 
separated into two disjoint regions by the existing boundary. This constituted the essence of 
Stacey’s proof by contradiction. 
 In Session 9, Stacey was asked to prove the following: 
Prove: If 𝑌 is a compact subspace of the Hausdorff space 𝑋, and 𝑥଴ is a point of 
𝑋 that is not in 𝑌, then there exist disjoint open sets 𝑈 and 𝑉 containing 𝑥଴ and 𝑌, 
respectively. 
Although Stacey never identified the key idea of the proof in Session 9, the interplay of diagram 
modification and gesture guided her away from at least one inappropriate idea, and she continued 
to use these tools in further exploration of the conjecture. 
 Stacey began by reading the given statement and extracting information from the problem 
into a list written using mathematical notation (Figure 16), explaining that she “wrote it out in 
symbols to help [her] think of it better.” It seemed that Stacey did not initially have a heuristic 
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idea to convince herself of the truth of the claim in this session. In other sessions, Stacey quickly 
began to speak, draw, or gesture after she had read the prompt, giving some sort of intuitive 
description of the scenario. In this case, after Stacey finished writing down her list of 
information, she picked up her textbook and began to read. Shortly thereafter, she examined the 
problem again and reasoned that 𝑌 must be closed, as it was a compact subspace of a Hausdorff 
space. 
 
Figure 16: Stacey’s notation extracted from the prompt in Session 9. 
 Upon making this realization, Stacey drew the diagram in Figure 17 (left). 
 
Figure 17: Stacey’s diagram from Session 9. 
Stacey explained, 
The open set 𝑈 would be the complement of 𝑌 in 𝑋 [writing 𝐶௑(𝑌) (Figure 17, 
right)], because you know it’s open because 𝑌 is closed. I don’t know if there’s a 
theorem or something that would get me there, but the fact that 𝑌 is a compact 
subspace of something Hausdorff might mean that there exists an open set within 
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it [metaphoric gesture indicating a subset of 𝑌] – oh wait, no. Because 𝑌 has to be 
in 𝑉 [static point to her inscription, 𝑌 ⊆ 𝑉 (right)]. So we need something like this 
[draws a larger set containing 𝑌, labels it 𝑉 (right)]. And then you also need their 
intersection to be empty. So I guess you can’t really take just the complement of 
𝑌 [static point to the label 𝐶௑(𝑌) (right)] because – you can’t just take the set 𝑌 
because it’s closed, you need an open set for 𝑉. So you need something bigger 
than 𝑌 [tracing point to the boundary of 𝑉 (right)], but if you take anything bigger 
than 𝑌, then you’re in the complement of it [static point to the label 𝑋], and then 
the intersection isn’t empty. So you need something within this complement of 𝑌 
[static point to 𝐶௑(𝑌)] to be the set 𝑈. 
Based on the way she began this excerpt, it appeared that Stacey thought she had identified the 
key idea, but she was thinking about finding a 𝑉 such that 𝑉 ⊆ 𝑌 instead of 𝑌 ⊆ 𝑉. Nevertheless, 
Stacey’s diagram construction appeared to be motivated by the fact that she thought she had a 
viable idea, or part of one, for how to prove the statement, based on her initial choice of 𝑈 =
𝐶௑(𝑌). Upon consultation with the notation she had extracted from the problem, Stacey 
recognized the flaw in her selection. She was able to articulate the error in her reasoning using 
her diagram, explaining that 𝑈 = 𝐶௑(𝑌) was not the set she needed because that would force 
𝑉 = 𝑌 in order to prevent 𝑈 and 𝑉 from intersecting. Beyond simply recognizing that her initial 
idea was flawed, Stacey’s line of reasoning helped her refine her idea by showing that she 
needed a subset of 𝐶௑(𝑌) to serve as the set 𝑈, since 𝑉 would need to contain 𝑌. 
 Stacey continued to work on this problem for the entirety of Session 9, and she never 
gave any evidence that she had identified the key idea, nor did she begin to write a formal proof. 
But she continued in this way, using a combination of verbal communication, gestures, and 
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diagram modification to reason about the problem, refining her reasoning through trial-and-error 
along the way. The rest of her work on this problem consisted of explorations of the various 
properties mentioned in the conjecture and their implications. 
Discussion 
 The data presented suggest that Stacey’s diagram construction was prompted by her 
perception that she had identified a suitable heuristic idea, that is, a general idea why the given 
statement was true (Raman, 2003). Once Stacey determined such an idea, she drew a diagram to 
represent the scenario in the problem and reasoned about the problem by means of a combination 
of speech, gestures, and alterations to her diagram. The interplay of these three aspects of her 
reasoning process led Stacey to recognize the key idea of the proof, which allowed her to then 
determine the procedural idea by translating her heuristic idea into logical-symbolic statements.
 The conversion of the problem into a diagram necessarily imbued the abstract 
mathematical objects in Stacey’s mind with physical and spatial properties that had direct 
correlations to mathematical properties in Stacey’s mind (e.g., overlapping “blobs” indicated a 
nonempty intersection of sets, concentric blobs indicated set containment, etc.). Reasoning about 
her diagrams with gestures and manipulation of these physical properties in Sessions 5 and 7 led 
Stacey to recognize the key ideas of those proofs, that is, the ideas that gave her a sense of 
understanding of why the given statement was true and would subsequently manifest in her 
formal proofs. Stacey never identified a key idea in Session 9, as evidenced by the fact that she 
never attempted to begin writing a formal proof. However, we propose that she was following 
the same cognitive trajectory she followed in Sessions 5 and 7. Her diagram did not appear until 
she believed she had a suitable heuristic idea from which to work, and her diagram and gestures 
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were produced in an effort to identify the key idea, but she simply did not reach this stage, hence 
she never produced a written proof. 
The Proof Writing Process 
 Stacey’s proving behaviors in Sessions 5, 7, and 9 followed the scheme shown in Figure 
18 below. 
 
Figure 18: Stacey’s proving trajectory in Sessions 5, 7, and 9. 
 The starting point in each of Sessions 5, 7, and 9 seemed to be the identification of a 
heuristic idea. Stacey began immediately constructing diagrams in Sessions 5 and 7 after she 
read the prompt. She explained her diagrams and how they represented the details from the 
problem, demonstrating that she had some kind of mental picture from which to work. In Session 
9, Stacey did not immediately begin drawing; rather, she began by writing down a list of the 
information given in the prompt and consulting her textbook for clues. Upon realizing that the 
subspace Y was closed, hence its complement was open, Stacey began drawing her diagram and 
reasoning that 𝑈 = 𝐶௑(𝑌) was a reasonable choice for one of the required open sets. Although 
Stacey quickly recognized that this choice was inappropriate in general, her supposition that it 
might have been a viable choice appeared to trigger the beginning of her diagram construction. 
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 Stacey’s explanation of her diagrams seemed to be the driving force behind her 
recognition of the key idea in Sessions 5 and 7. Although she had a heuristic idea in each case, it 
was not clear that she knew the same idea should work as a formal proof at first. In fact, it 
seemed that Stacey only recognized that her idea might work as a proof when she considered the 
physical limitations of her diagram. For example, in Session 5, Stacey seemed to convince 
herself that a set 𝐴 with the property that 𝐴 ∩ 𝑂 ≠ ∅ for each open set 𝑂 in 𝑋 must be dense in 𝑋 
by drawing a diagram. The idea that became her formal proof, however, was the idea she 
discovered when the density of A in X was violated: that her diagram had the physical property 
that two “blobs” might not overlap. She engaged in this sort of reasoning again in Session 7 
when she violated the given property that 𝑌 must be connected by allowing it to sit atop the 
shared boundary of her separation. Stacey did not identify the key idea in Session 9, but in her 
effort to discover the key idea, she repeatedly altered her diagram and, through diagram 
alteration and gesture use, reasoned about the conjecture via physical properties she assigned to 
the objects in the problem. 
 Stacey continued to reason about each problem with gesture and diagram use until she 
recognized the key idea of the proof. We took Stacey’s willingness to write a proof as evidence 
that she had discovered the key idea. As Raman (2003) defines it, the key idea is “an heuristic 
idea which one can map to a formal proof with appropriate sense of rigor” (p. 323). We do not 
assume that Stacey should know how to map this heuristic idea to a formal proof, only that it 
should. Thus, when Stacey moved on from her diagrammatic and gestural reasoning to begin 
writing a formal proof representing this reasoning, we took this to mean that she had ascertained 
that this heuristic idea could be transformed into a formal proof. 
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 Once Stacey had identified the key idea in Sessions 5 and 7, she immediately began the 
process of writing a formal proof. As Stacey was a novice prover, this process was not effortless 
in either case, and she occasionally required confirmation of the accuracy of her logic, language, 
and notation. In Session 9, Stacey never made an attempt to write a formal proof, but we note 
that she never identified the key idea of the proof in this session, thus preventing her from 
moving forward in her proving scheme. 
The Role of Embodied Cognition in Stacey’s Proving Process 
 In the sessions detailed in the data above, Stacey never (externally) referenced a specific 
example, nor did she appear to consider formal concept definitions, except to inform her diagram 
construction. Once a diagram had been constructed, Stacey’s reasoning hinged upon the physical 
features of the diagram. For example, in Session 5, Stacey drew a diagram to represent 𝐴 as a 
dense subset of a topological space 𝑋. She explained that she wanted to draw the border of 𝐴 
closer to the border of 𝑋, but she couldn’t, suggesting that the physical proximity of the borders 
of the two sets was significant to her thought process. This detail is more significant than it may 
seem on the surface, as, topologically speaking, there need not even be a metric with which to 
measure distance in a given topology. Yet distance was a significant component of Stacey’s 
concept image, as increasing the physical distance between the borders of 𝐴 and 𝑋 in order to fit 
an open set between them was central to the key idea Stacey developed into her proof in this 
session. 
 Stacey’s diagram construction, gesture, and language appeared to attribute several 
physical properties to the mathematical objects under investigation in her reasoning. Stacey’s 
conception of a dense subset seemed to rely heavily on the Near-Far schema (Lakoff, 2012). The 
boundary of the set 𝐴 and the boundary of 𝑋 were ascribed a very close physical proximity, and 
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the assumption was made that taking the closure of 𝐴 meant extending the boundary of 𝐴 just a 
little bit more until it coincided with the boundary of 𝑋. The gap between the boundaries of 𝐴 
and 𝑋 was assumed to be so small that it would be impossible for any open set – which were 
imbued with the property of being an enclosed region with some nonzero area – to exist in the 
gap. This is consistent with Stacey’s language during other sessions in which she described 
finding the closure of a set as including all the points “arbitrarily close.” Stacey’s recognition of 
the key idea appeared to hinge on this notion of distance and arbitrary closeness; it was her 
consideration of what might happen if the distance between the boundaries of 𝐴 and 𝑋 were large 
enough to accommodate an open set that ultimately led her to recognize that this line of 
reasoning would translate into a proof (the key idea). 
 When reasoning about connected spaces and separations, Stacey’s reasoning reflected the 
Container schema, in that her concept image of a connected set seemed to be a container with 
one continuous boundary and no subdivisions, while a disconnected set was represented by two 
adjacent containers sharing a common boundary. This reasoning made Stacey’s contradiction 
obvious: If 𝑌 wasn’t contained entirely in 𝐶 or in 𝐷, then it would have to straddle the boundary 
separating 𝐶 and 𝐷, splitting 𝑌 itself into two adjacent containers sharing a common boundary. 
 These structural components were embodied for Stacey, not simply in that she gestured 
about them, but because her gestures and her diagram suggested that these abstract mathematical 
objects had real, physical properties. Though a separation is defined simply in terms of open sets, 
which in general can take many forms, Stacey has imbued a separation with the physical 
representation of two containers which share a common boundary. Similarly, Stacey’s gestures 
suggested that she viewed a connected set as a single container with no dividing boundaries. The 
contrast created by this assignment of physical properties to abstract entities appears to have 
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prompted Stacey’s recognition of the key idea. As her modification of the diagram at the end of 
the above excerpt shows, if a container with no internal boundary were to sit on top of such a 
boundary, then it would necessarily be split into two adjacent containers separated by a boundary 
– the connected set would be disconnected. 
 Once Stacey came to this realization, she immediately began to write a proof by way of 
contradiction, supposing 𝑌 was connected and intersected both 𝐶 and 𝐷, and eventually finding a 
separation of 𝑌. The idea that “It can’t be in both, because if it was like that, it would be 
[disconnected]” became the key idea for Stacey: the idea seemed to convince her that the 
statement was true, and she recognized, through the use of her gestures and diagrams, that this 
idea would translate well into a proof. 
 Stacey constructed her diagram in Session 9 in response to an inappropriate heuristic 
idea. Stacey’s inscription of notation extracted from the problem statement appeared to save her 
from this pitfall: her expectation that 𝑉 should be contained in 𝑌 conflicted with the notation that 
stated 𝑌 must be contained in 𝑉. This may have triggered conflicting mental images, causing 
Stacey to realize her error. Stacey’s view of the set 𝑉 as a physical extension of the region 
contained within 𝑌 and her perception of the overlap between 𝑉 and 𝐶௑(𝑌) to be representative 
of a nonempty intersection made it clear that her initial choice of 𝑈 = 𝐶௑(𝑌) was insufficient to 
prove the given statement. Stacey’s embodied view of these sets is evident in her word choice, as 
she expressed that she would need “something bigger than 𝑌,” but that taking something bigger 
than 𝑌 would mean “being in the complement of it,” her pointing gestures suggesting that she 
was referring to the complement of 𝑌 as a physical location in the diagram. 
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The Role of Commognition in Stacey’s Proving Process 
 Sfard’s (2001, 2009) theory of commognition regards thinking and communicating as 
two sides of the same coin. While the word communication typically refers specifically to 
interpersonal communication, thinking is regarded as intrapersonal communication, i.e., 
communication with oneself. Further, the rejection of the dualism of thinking and 
communication allows us to recognize deeper connections between the two: 
The disappearance of a thinking-communicating dichotomy automatically 
eliminates several other splits. Indeed, once talking and gesturing stop being but 
“expressions” of thinking and become the process of thinking in itself, there is no 
point any longer in trying to separate the form (a sequence of words or body 
movements) from the content (thoughts, ideas) of communication, and it becomes 
equally pointless to speak about meanings “conveyed” in words, implying that it 
is a self-sustained entity of sorts, capable of appearing in many different verbal 
disguises. (Sfard, 2009, p. 195) 
From this perspective, we view Stacey’s gestures not simply as an expression of ideas she 
already holds in their final forms, but rather as the development of ideas. 
 Though Sfard (2009) referred to gesture and speech as two inseparable parts of 
commognition, she did propose different functions for what she calls “utterances” and gestures. 
Utterances provide humanity with the capacity for recursivity – the ability to “speak about 
speaking, to think about thinking” (p. 196). Recursivity allows for increases in complexity by 
condensing complicated ideas into signifiers which act as “repositories of complexity” (p. 197), 
encapsulations of complex hierarchies of ideas into compact notation. These repositories of 
complexity allow us to communicate more easily about complex information. Gesture, according 
111 
 
to Sfard, serves the purpose of “realizing mathematical signifiers” (2009, p. 198). That is, 
gestures serve the purpose of clarifying what is meant by the utterances being used, and they 
help ensure that both the speaker and the listener are referencing the same objects and features 
with their terminology. This can be done using deictic gestures, in the case that the referent is 
present, or using iconic or representational gestures in the case that the referent is not physically 
present. 
 Stacey, for her part, seemed to use her diagrams as repositories of complexity. The 
prompts given in the sessions contained complex information, some of them using terminology 
with which Stacey was not yet familiar. Each proof required the use of multiple pieces of 
information working in concert to produce a logical argument. As such, prior to constructing her 
proofs, Stacey extracted information from each prompt and deposited that information into a 
diagram. Stacey was then able to talk and gesture more easily about the given information, 
forming connections and making hypothesis, each new connection being added to the repository 
through a modification of the diagram. As each addition was made to the diagram, Stacey was 
then able to make further connections and see how all the pieces of information given worked 
together to form the basis of the proof she would later construct. In this way, her diagrams served 
as a sort of storage facility for mathematical information, allowing her to add new information 
one or two pieces at a time until she had all the information she needed in one place to form her 
argument. 
 Stacey’s gestures were not only for the benefit of interpersonal communication; they also 
helped her keep her own thinking on track. In Session 9, we saw that Stacey initially constructed 
her diagram while thinking about an incorrect heuristic idea: she was thinking about finding an 
open subset contained in 𝑌, rather than finding an open subset that contained 𝑌. She only 
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recognized that she was moving down the wrong path when she pointed to her inscription that 
read 𝑌 ⊆ 𝑉. This effort to communicate her idea verbally, supported with gestures, exposed the 
error in her reasoning when a conflict arose between her utterances and her gestures, and it 
allowed her to recalibrate and approach the problem along a different path. 
Conclusions 
 In this paper, we addressed the following research question: “How do students synergize 
cognition, gestures, diagrams, and communication when writing proofs in topology?” We 
presented a case study of Stacey, an undergraduate taking a first course in topology. When 
working on a proof, Stacey based her diagram on a heuristic idea representing her understanding 
of the problem, then used a combination of speech, gestures, and diagram modification to arrive 
at the key idea of the proof, which she then used to write a formal proof. 
 We argued that Stacey’s diagrams and her gesture use grounded the abstract 
mathematical ideas Stacey was working with, allowing her to reason about them in terms of the 
physical properties that her diagrams and gestures imbued them with. We also argued, in line 
with Sfard’s (2009) theory of commognition, that Stacey’s speech and gestures were not just 
elements of her self-expression, but they were integral components of her thinking, and gave her 
a physical means of transforming her understanding over the course of working on a proof. 
 The embodied perspective suggests that gestures and speech occur together 
spontaneously, and the brain uses conceptual schema to reason about abstract ideas in terms of 
physical properties. This, together with the notion that gesture and speech are components of 
cognition, suggest that Stacey’s external communication of her ideas – whether she was talking 
to herself or to somebody else – played a vital role in Stacey’s evolving concept image of the 
problems she worked on. The combination of Stacey’s verbal communication, gesture, and 
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diagrams also appeared to prevent Stacey from spending time working on unproductive proving 
strategies. 
 This work adds to a growing body of literature suggesting that gestures and verbal 
communication support student thinking about and understanding of mathematics. An interesting 
future project would be the investigation of this kind of reasoning in other branches of 
mathematics, such as modern algebra or differential equations. Topology is intimately connected 
with physical notions like distance and connectivity; whether this kind of visual/embodied 
reasoning is useful in other fields of mathematics would be of great interest to the pedagogical 
community. Even if this approach is not applicable across different fields, learning how to 
translate verbal-symbolic information into a diagrammatic form and interpret it from an 
appropriate embodied perspective may present a powerful content-specific tool for students 
writing proofs in topology. 
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SUMMARY OF PAPERS 
 In the papers presented above, I described an in-depth case study of Stacey, an 
undergraduate taking a first course in introductory topology. I examined Stacey’s proving 
behaviors from three different perspectives: problem solving, example use, and embodied 
cognition and commognition. In each paper, I described the contribution made by the relevant 
perspective to Stacey’s recognition of the key idea of the proof (Raman, 2003) and to her 
subsequent writing of a proof. 
 In Paper 1, I examined Stacey’s behaviors through the lens of the Problem-Solving Cycle 
of Carlson and Bloom’s (2005) Multidimensional Problem-Solving Framework. Assuming that 
proving and problem solving were similar in their cognitive demands, my intent was to 
determine the extent to which Stacey’s mathematical behaviors mirrored those of expert 
mathematicians. I observed that Stacey did progress through essentially the same series of phases 
when writing her proofs that experts do when solving problems, but with differences in the order 
in which she engaged in each phase. With respect to the checking phase, Stacey also frequently 
conducted external checking of her progress by asking questions of the mathematical authority 
present during her proof writing. 
 Prior to data collection, I expected that Stacey might rely heavily on examples when 
working with concepts in topology due to her relative inexperience in advanced mathematics. In 
Paper 2, I sought to answer the research questions “What kinds of examples do students use to 
help them write proofs in topology, and how do they use them?” I identified a type of abstract 
visual representation that Stacey reasoned about as if it were an example, hence I named objects 
of this type structural examples. Structural examples possess all the essential properties of a 
definition or a given situation (e.g., a mathematical conjecture), but no other properties. Stacey 
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used her structural examples to gain an intuitive sense of the statement she was trying to prove or 
disprove, to gain insight into the technique for proving a true statement by manipulating the 
properties of the example, and to identify the properties of the necessary counterexample when 
disproving false statements. 
 Paper 2 made it clear that Stacey’s structural examples played a pivotal role for her in the 
identification of key ideas, but a more thorough analysis of how Stacey’s structural examples led 
her to recognize key ideas was warranted. I noted that Stacey frequently gestured when talking 
about her structural examples. This, coupled with her manipulations of the spatial properties of 
her examples during the planning phase of Carlson and Bloom’s framework, led to the analysis 
in Paper 3. Paper 3 described Stacey’s proving behaviors through the combined lenses of 
embodied cognition (Lakoff & Núñez, 2000) and commognition (Sfard, 2009). From this 
perspective, I identified that Stacey used speech, gestures, and diagrams as part of her thinking, 
rather than as representations of her thinking. Furthermore, Stacey’s representation of 
mathematical objects using structural examples grounded those objects in the physical world, 
assigning them the physical properties that Stacey manipulated in her search for key ideas. 
CONNECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The results of Papers 1, 2, and 3 combine to form an in-depth view of Stacey’s cognitive 
construction of the elements of mathematical structure necessary to complete proofs in topology 
(Chihara, 2004; Piaget, 1985; Resnik, 1981; Shapiro, 1997; von Glasersfeld, 2005; Wadsworth, 
1975). From a top-down view, Stacey’s development of the concepts of topological structures 
was viewed using Carlson and Bloom’s (2005) Multidimensional Problem-Solving Framework. 
Recall that Carlson and Bloom’s Problem-Solving Cycle consists of four main phases: orienting, 
planning, executing, and checking. During each phase of this cycle, Stacey engaged in particular 
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behaviors tailored toward uncovering the necessary structures to complete her proofs. In the 
following, I detail how Stacey’s behaviors in each phase aided in her cognitive construction of 
the relevant topological structures and the roles played by her structural examples and her 
interactions with them as grounded representations of her mental constructs. 
 Carlson and Bloom’s original results remark that, among other behaviors, all of the 
expert mathematicians in their study were “remarkably efficient in constructing either a picture 
or a mental image of the problem situation as they attempted to make sense of the question” 
(Carlson & Bloom, 2005, p. 62) during the orienting phase of the Problem-Solving Cycle. My 
analysis of Stacey’s behaviors in Paper 1 shows that Stacey often exhibited the same behavior, 
and furthermore, it identified the goal of this behavior as the recognition of the key idea of the 
proof (Raman, 2003). This result supports work by Stylianou (2002) which argued that 
mathematicians construct visual representations of problem scenarios in problem solving for the 
deliberate purpose of extracting information from them, but extends the scope of the result to the 
writing of formal proofs. The discussion in Paper 3 highlights the role of Stacey’s visual 
representations as embodiments of a heuristic idea held in Stacey’s mind, and Paper 2 further 
recognizes Stacey’s visual representations as structural examples, which she will later 
manipulate in her quest for the key idea. The recognition of Stacey’s visual representations as 
examples suggests that, for Stacey, there exists an injective mapping of the specific properties of 
her example onto the abstract structures of the mathematical object she holds in her mind. Thus, 
manipulations of her structural examples translated to manipulations of the mathematical objects 
they were created to represent. 
 The planning phase of Carlson and Bloom’s Problem-Solving Cycle contained a sub-
cycle they referred to as conjecture-imagine-evaluate. While they reported that this process 
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largely took place entirely within their subjects’ minds, Stacey demonstrated this process 
externally through the manipulations of her structural examples. Stacey’s structural examples not 
only acted as instantiations of her concept image, but through their embodiment as physical 
entities (diagrams), Stacey imbued her examples with spatial properties. The grounding of 
Stacey’s mental images in the form of diagrams allowed for the manipulation of their physical 
properties, leading to implied consequences on the basis of the cognitive schema associated with 
the structure of the diagram. The diagram’s role as an example then allowed Stacey to internalize 
the manipulations she performed and map them from their embodied properties back onto their 
abstract mathematical properties. The interplay of Stacey’s speech and gestures about her 
structural examples and the spatial properties those examples inherited as embodied 
representations of abstract mental structures allowed Stacey to physically manipulate abstract 
mental objects. This ultimately led to the achievement of Stacey’s implicit goal of identifying the 
key ideas of her proofs. 
 The executing phase of Carlson and Bloom’s framework was the phase in which their 
experts produced their mathematical arguments after they had identified a suitable strategy. This 
corresponds to the assembly of the procedural idea (Raman, 2003) into a formal proof. Stacey’s 
executing phase consisted of the translation of the spatial properties of her structural examples 
into formal mathematical symbols and terminology. In the cases when Stacey was disproving 
false statements, her executing activities consisted of the identification and construction of an 
appropriate counterexample. During the course of Stacey’s formal proof writing, she often 
returned to the planning phase to reexamine some of the ideas she had expressed there. Stacey 
was inexperienced with the intuition of topology as well as the notation and language used in 
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topology proofs. Thus, Stacey often transitioned briefly into the checking phase as well to ensure 
that her logic, notation, and language were appropriate. 
 Stacey’s checking behaviors were primarily external, while those of the experts in 
Carlson and Bloom’s study were largely internal. Because Stacey had identified what she 
believed to be the key idea, her checking primarily consisted of asking questions about notation 
and language. Often, she wrote down what she believed to be appropriate notation to express her 
ideas, then she consulted with me, expressing her intentions in plain English and asking if her 
mathematical language appropriately conveyed her argument. At the end of our sessions, we 
frequently holistically reviewed Stacey’s progress for the purpose of her edification, as I had 
intended for these sessions to benefit the student participants as well. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING 
 Topology is routinely taught as proof-based courses at the undergraduate and graduate 
levels of mathematics. Most notably, this study contributes to the literature on the teaching and 
learning of undergraduate topology, which is sparse, and of advanced mathematics as a whole. 
Furthermore, proof writing and interpretation are notoriously challenging skills for students to 
master at all levels. My work provides new perspectives on students’ reasoning about proofs and 
demonstrates a trajectory that turned out to be not only effective for proof writing, but instructive 
for my participant’s understanding of concepts in topology. 
 Although this is an isolated case study of one student’s behaviors, my results provide 
useful insights into productive student behaviors. First, this result provides support for the 
pedagogical suggestion that students should produce visual arguments on which to base their 
formal mathematics (Fiorella & Mayer, 2016; Raman, 2003; Weber & Alcock, 2004; D. Zazkis 
et al., 2016; R. Zazkis et al., 1996). Moreover, students should be instructed and encouraged to 
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use their visual representations in exploration of concepts (Booth & Thomas, 2000; Stylianou, 
2002; R. Zazkis et al., 1996). Stacey’s success in writing proofs was not a consequence of simply 
having a visual representation; she used her visual representations as aids in her search for key 
ideas. I agree with Leron (1983, 1985) that, rather than presenting students with proofs written in 
their final form, teachers should present proofs by first providing an intuitive idea of what the 
proof will show and then filling in details later. The intuitive idea Leron described is exactly the 
key idea described by Raman, and the discovery of this idea was precisely the primary goal of 
Stacey’s proof writing process in my data. Showing proofs in their final form obscures much of 
the intuition behind the arguments presented and perpetuates the idea that mathematicians are 
effortlessly brilliant and discover these complicated proofs in their final form. I believe this sort 
of proof presentation also encourages the memorization of proofs rather than their discovery, 
creating a culture of “mathematics as memorization” instead of “mathematics as discovery.” 
Getting students to see, as Stacey did, that looking for an intuitive explanation and then working 
to formalize it may encourage their success in proof writing. From a teacher’s perspective, I 
believe that the creative portion of mathematics that involves devising ideas and recognizing 
why they work is the most challenging to instill in students. Once they “get the idea,” the rest is 
often mechanical. 
 Finally, my work provides support for the employment of the embodied cognition 
perspective and the theory of commognition in the advanced mathematics classroom. Though 
they are often taught in a very abstract way through definitions and theorems, mathematical ideas 
are rooted in intuition about structure and the physical world. Encouraging students to view 
mathematics as an entity grounded in physical and spatial reasoning and to leverage the 
corresponding embodied properties in their reasoning can lead to keen insights about abstract 
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ideas. Furthermore, with the recognition that talking and gesturing are inherently part of the 
process of thinking, we should encourage students to reason aloud, to draw diagrams, and to 
gesture while thinking about mathematics, even if they are only talking to themselves. The 
process of communicating ideas is the process of reasoning about those ideas; to inhibit oneself 
from speaking, drawing, and gesturing is to inhibit oneself from taking full advantage of their 
cognitive faculties. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Topology as a whole remains largely unstudied by the undergraduate mathematics 
education research community. Studies to investigate what areas of topology (content, pedagogy, 
or otherwise) are the most problematic for teachers and students would greatly benefit the 
research community. Specific future studies should investigate students’ concept images of 
topics in topology, their relevance to concept definitions, and their usefulness in constructing 
proofs. Studies are also needed to investigate students’ development and uses of explicit 
examples (see Paper 2) in topology. I am also curious to learn about students’ conceptions of the 
field of topology as a whole, i.e., what the field studies and its significance to mathematics. I 
suspect there may be a range of responses including geometry and spatial relationships and 
applications to analysis, among others. Students’ perceptions of the field may influence their 
approaches to problems, perhaps prompting some students to reason geometrically, others to 
reason through examples from analysis, and others to reason simply by manipulation of symbols 
and definitions. 
 With regard to structural examples, the prevalence of this phenomenon should be studied 
not only in topology but in other fields of advanced mathematics like abstract algebra and 
differential equations as well. The geometric nature of topology may push students to reason in 
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terms of visual structure more so in this field than in others. Studies may also investigate the 
particular topics in topology for which visual strategies prove most useful for students. Teaching 
experiments may also be useful to identify instructional strategies to help students use structural 
examples and visual representations in more productive manners. 
 It is well established that interpersonal communication of mathematical ideas can support 
student learning. Studies should also examine students’ self-explanatory behaviors, specifically 
in the context of proof. My results suggest that reasoning aloud, even if only for one’s own 
benefit, may transform students’ thinking about a proof and support their recognition of the key 
idea. 
 Finally, though there is already some work in this area (Carlson & Bloom, 2005; 
Stylianou, 2002), I believe the mathematics education community would benefit from more 
studies on the proving and problem-solving behaviors of expert mathematicians and graduate 
students. Studies in undergraduate mathematics education tend to focus on undergraduates and 
the obstacles they face in learning. Observation of the behaviors of experts may provide useful 
information about what behaviors we might want our students to develop, and examination of 
graduate students could provide some insight into productive learning trajectories leading to 
those results. Studies of the development of mathematical ideas over time could lead to 
invaluable insights about the kinds of activities in which lower-level students should be engaged. 
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APPENDIX A: SESSION 5 (PROVE) CODED FOR PAPER 1 
The transcript excerpt below is the Prove task from Session 5, as coded for Paper 1. 
Speaker identifiers were abbreviated in the SPEAKER column: I is the Facilitator (Interviewer), 
S is Stacey, and T is Tom. 
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APPENDIX B: SESSION 5 (PROVE) CODED FOR PAPERS 2 AND 3 
The transcript excerpt below is the Prove task from Session 5, as coded for Papers 2 and 3. 
Speaker identifiers were abbreviated in the SPEAKER column: I is the Facilitator (Interviewer), 
S is Stacey, and T is Tom. 
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